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complexity, but I would give my life for the simplicity on the
other side of complexity.
–Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
In 1872, an American newspaper called the Woman’s Exponent
began publication. The Exponent’s subtitle trumpeted “the Rights of
Women of all Nations,”1 and during more than forty years of twice-monthly
publication, the paper remained focused on women’s issues in a “tone . . .
neither self-conscious nor cautious, and it firmly and directly discussed
2
feminist ideas. . . .” For example, one early column asserted that “[w]oman
was designed to be something more than a domestic drudge,”3 and a few
years later, in 1877, the paper editorialized: “Woman feels her servitude,
4
her degradation, and she is determined to assert her rights.”
The editors of the Exponent shared the convictions of many
nineteenth-century feminists, echoing in print the credo of the famous
feminist and suffragette Elizabeth Cady Stanton that “[w]omen must stand
up and speak for themselves.”5 To that end, the paper regularly “reported
on the triumphs of women around the globe in achieving special awards or
6
recognition.” In one story about a young San Francisco girl who had won
an academic competition for a trip to Paris, the Exponent writer proclaimed
that this was “quite a victory for the girls, and proves the oft repeated
assertion that the brains of girls are not inferior to the brains of boys!”7 The
Exponent also reported “progress made in the area of women’s rights
around the country and around the world,” often reprinting speeches given
at women’s political gatherings. In 1890, the paper devoted a long article to
documenting “the need for equal pay for equal work,”8 and, according to a
prominent Exponent editor named Emmeline Wells, “[f]rom its first issue it
9
was the champion of the suffrage cause. . . .”
In light of the Exponent’s devotion to progressive feminism in the
late nineteenth century, it would be hard to overestimate the commitment of
the women who produced the journal to the cause of empowering women
1

Judith Rasmussen Dushku, Feminists, in MORMON SISTERS: WOMEN IN EARLY UTAH
178-79 (Claudia L. Bushman, ed.,1976).
2
Id. at 178.
3
Id. at 183.
4
Id. at 178.
5
Id. at 179.
6
Id. at 183.
7
Id. at 184.
8
Id. at 182-83.
9
Id. at 184 n.21 (citing Susan B. Anthony, The History of Woman Suffrage, 6 vols.,
4:936-37 (Susan B. Anthony & Ida Husted Harper, eds., 1902)).
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everywhere or to the principle that women were as entitled to the pursuit of
social independence, personal accomplishment, and political autonomy as
men were. Why, then, would so important an advocate for women’s (and
human) rights as Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of the abolitionist classic
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, excoriate these same women for being complicit in
“degrading bondage,” for being party to “a cruel slavery whose chains have
cut into the very hearts of thousands of our sisters.”?10 Why would the
popular nineteenth-century American author Jennie Froiseth declare that
these activist women were part of a community that supported the
“degradation of woman,” a community that could “flourish only where she
[woman] is regarded and treated as a slave.”?11
Stowe, Froiseth, and many others were harshly critical because the
robust feminists who produced the Woman’s Exponent were Mormons,
members of Joseph Smith’s controversial Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints – a religion best known for its practice of polygamy.12 Indeed,
observers then and now have found it difficult to understand how these
compelling advocates of women’s progress could simultaneously
countenance or even engage in plural marriage, which would seem to have
been inherently coercive, sexist, and unfair. This particular paradox, the
dilemma of nineteenth-century Mormon women, is the initial focus of this
article, as well as the point of access to a larger theme: the enduring paradox
of community and autonomy – of the collective and the individual – in
American society.
Two principal terms of my analysis here, “community” and
“autonomy,” are themselves rich with ambiguity, even paradoxical. Part of
what makes the community-autonomy tension a genuine paradox, rather
than merely an interesting dichotomy, is that there exists no clean practical
line separating the two ideals; to some degree, depending on one’s life
circumstances, every human is simultaneously an autonomous individual
(or at least lives by the necessary fiction of being a coherent self, capable of
10

MRS. T. B. H. (FANNY)
IN POLYGAMY, at vi (1890).
11

STENHOUSE, TELL IT ALL, THE STORY OF A WOMAN’S LIFE

Carrel Hilton Sheldon, Mormon Haters, in (Bushman, ed., supra note 1) 121
(quoting KIMBALL YOUNG, ISN’T ONE WIFE ENOUGH? 11 (1954)).
12
The term “polygamy" may properly refer to any kind of plural marriage, although
generally the term has come to mean a marriage consisting of one husband and several
wives, probably (in American society, at least) because that is how Mormons practiced
plural marriage in the nineteenth century and how current Mormon fundamentalists
practice it in the intermountain West. Here I will use “polygamy” and “plural marriage”
interchangably in this conventional sense, denoting the marriage configuration of one man
and more than one woman. To be precise, though, the term “polygyny" defines the
arrangement of one husband and plural wives, while "polyandry" means the opposite – one
woman and plural husbands. American law has tended to complicate this terminology,
generally using the term “bigamy" (meaning, literally, one husband and two wives) to
define all plural marriage situations.
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meaningful agency) and a member of various communities (family, ethnic,
religious, professional, etc.), such that it matters a great deal how we
characterize the balance one might strike between the two ideals in a given
situation, and, more important still, how we assess that particular choice of
balance.
Mormon polygamy, what many nineteenth-century critics called the
“Mormon Problem,” provides a truly distinct historical context in which to
explore this ongoing tension in American law and culture between the
ideals of community and autonomy. Its uniqueness notwithstanding, what
the social phenomenon of Mormon polygamy produced in high relief was a
variation on a quintessential American theme, played out in a clash of
public narratives. Nineteenth-century Mormon women found themselves in
an exquisitely difficult position morally, emotionally, and practically:
whether and how to reconcile their religious faith, which included
polygamy, with their political and social commitments to the progress of
women. Put more broadly, these women experienced a deep conflict
between community and autonomy, for their loyalty to religious community
appeared incompatible with their loyalty to the progressive vision of
advancing the rights and individual autonomy of American women,
including their own.13
The uniqueness of Mormon polygamy illuminates this classic
paradox in new and instructive ways, especially as to issues of sexual
politics, social identity, personal autonomy, and cultural legitimacy.14 The
particular, concrete dilemmas that invariably issue from the paradox of
community and autonomy are complex to begin with; their “telling” is more
complicated still, and more consequential, because we come to “know” any
particular social reality only by “reading” or “hearing” it as represented by
other voices. This narrative mediation of things is thus an inevitable,
necessary process that is both hermeneutic (i.e., informing how we
13

Of course, we might talk also of a “community” of progressive women and men
far larger than the religious community of Mormons to which I refer. By the same token,
we might emphasize the individualistic, autonomy-oriented aspects of Mormonism, a
nascent American religion that claimed First Amendment protection for the actions of its
members – namely, plural marriage – undertaken in order to practice their religious beliefs.
This chicken-and-egg quality of the relationship between community and autonomy
underscores the richness of the paradox.
14
As I shall discuss in Part III, a remarkably similar cluster of communityautonomy issues arises regarding the cultural and legal status of homosexuals in
contemporary society, particularly on the question of same-sex marriage. Indeed, the
cultural and legal narratives that people use to portray gays and lesbians, and the social
dynamics that attend those narratives, are rhetorically quite similar to the nineteenthcentury clash of narratives over Mormon polygamy. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) for “anti-gay“
narratives; see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) for “pro-gay“ narratives.
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interpret) and epistemological (i.e., influencing how we know). Once we
recognize this all-encompassing condition of the narrative textuality of
discourse,15 we can “look behind” any particular narrative – someone’s
distinct telling of things – to analyze the rhetorical strategies that produced
the narrative in the first place: How are such dilemmas narrated on the
public stage? By whom? For what purpose, and with what interests in
mind? With what imagery? To what audience – and thus to what values – is
this narrative meant to appeal?
Understanding both the mediating influence of narratives and the
importance of evaluating those narratives from a rhetorical standpoint is
crucial to analyzing legal discourse in all of its operations – from
legislators’ big picture debates about social values, to trial attorneys’
common sense courtroom narratives deployed to persuade juries, to judges’
precedent-minded policy rationales meant to justify court decisions (the
dimension of legal discourse on which I will focus here), to law professors’
theoretical jurisprudential discussions in law journals. At whatever level,
legal discourse is, after all, the language of the law, whose purpose is to
determine, establish, and legitimize the rules of human society. As to
Mormon polygamy, a seminal example of such discourse is the 1878 U.S.
Supreme Court case of Reynolds v. United States.16
In Reynolds, the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal antipolygamy laws. In authoring the opinion, Chief Justice Morrisson Waite
presented and justified the decision through a narrative championing the
institution of conventional, monogamous marriage as the prime guarantor of
social stability. As part of this justifying narrative,17 the High Court
15

For a more law-oriented discussion of the notion of textuality and related issues, see
Gregory C. Pingree, Afterword: Toward Stable Principles and Useful Hegemonies, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 807 (2003).
16
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
17
What I call here the Court’s “justifying narrative” is closely related to the more
conventional concepts of the “judicial reasoning” or the “judicial rationale” of the
opinion. However, by “narrative” I mean a more encompassing, less circumscribed
idea of textuality than these conventional terms connote. As I have discussed above,
narrative, undersood broadly, properly characterizes all purposeful discourse. The
judicial opinion is nothing if not purposeful in various important ways, from the
purpose of maintaining or revising precedent to the purpose of legally, historically,
and culturally justifying the position taken and the values espoused. Much of this
rhetorical activity is implicit, of course, but that does not diminish the reality that
judicial opinions, like all texts, are complex narratives, themselves made of layers of
other narratives. The subject of narrative in legal discourse has been actively explored
in legal scholarship for nearly two decades. See generally Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
(1983); Special Issue: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); Daniel A.
Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Special Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing, 62
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affirmed the trial court’s warnings about the dangers that polygamy posed
to “pure-minded women and . . . innocent children,” “victims” who would
“multiply and spread themselves over the land.”18
The Court’s
determination that Mormon polygamy was “subversive of good order,”19
and thus not protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, came at the expense of a particular group’s claim of religious
freedom. As such, Reynolds highlighted one important ground upon which
the law tends to side with the community over the individual. More
precisely, the decision established a standard for privileging the more
communal value of “good social order” over the more individualistic right
of a particular community’s unconventional religious practice.20
I have here introduced two kinds of public narrative – cultural and
legal – by which Mormon polygamy was known in nineteenth-century
America, and I have articulated the fundamental community-autonomy
paradox that those narratives serve to illuminate. I will pursue this
discussion further in three parts. In Part I, I will briefly review fundamental
aspects of Mormon history, particularly those related to the practice of
plural marriage. In Part II, I will selectively consider how nineteenthcentury Mormon polygamy was represented on the public stage through
both cultural and legal narratives. I will analyze the rhetorical strategies at
play in what became a nineteenth-century narrative battle over the
legitimacy of Mormon polygamy. In Part III, I will suggest how this
rhetorical approach to the American “telling” of Mormon polygamy – a
study of narratives meant to legitimize or delegitimize a core aspect of
cultural identity – might usefully be applied to a contemporary social
controversy that underscores the paradox of community and autonomy:
homosexuality and the so-called culture wars over family values and the
meaning of marriage. I will conclude by briefly situating my rhetorical
analysis of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy within the ongoing
philosophical debate about the fate of liberalism in a democratic society.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MORMON POLYGAMY
The mark of religion is that it is the practice of an ultimate
concern that orders all other concerns, an unconditioned
loyalty that trumps all other loyalties.
– Reinhold Niebuhr

U. CHI. L. REV. 1363-1519 (1995); Symposium: Rethinking Robert Cover’s Nomos
and Narrative, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2005).
18
Reynolds 98 U.S. at 168.
19
Id. at 164.
20
Employment Division v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1990).
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According to Mormon history,21 in 1820, Joseph Smith, fourteen years
old and part of a large, religiously diverse family in upstate New York,
sought divine guidance regarding the many Christian sects competing for
public attention during the Second Great Awakening. In response to his
efforts, the boy was visited by God the Father, Jesus Christ, and the Holy
Spirit. God informed Joseph that none of the churches then existing had the
full truth; that God intended to restore to earth the true church as Christ had
organized it two millennia earlier; and that he (Joseph Smith) would be the
instrument of this restoration, the first prophet of modern times.
Over the next twenty-four years, Smith received various revelations
about church organization and doctrine. In 1830, he officially established
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints22 (indicating that Christ’s
original church was now restored), members of which were called
“Mormons” by most people because of the Book of Mormon, which Smith
had translated from ancient records. The Mormons considered (and still
consider) the revelations that Joseph Smith received, as well as the Book of
Mormon and the Bible, to constitute their body of holy scripture.
The Mormons came to the Great Basin desert after suffering years of
social and legal persecution in New York, Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois,
culminating in the June 1844 assassination of Joseph Smith in Carthage,
Missouri. General public hostility to the Mormons, at first a product of
their cultish devotion to Smith, had increased significantly with the
discovery, sometime during the late 1830s or early 1840s, that the church
leader and some of his followers had commenced the practice of plural
marriage.
After Smith’s martyrdom in 1844, the Mormons made the arduous
journey westward under the leadership of Brigham Young. They settled in
what is now the Salt Lake Valley in the summer of 1847, choosing this
“largely uninhabited desert as the center place for the kingdom” so that they
could “be left alone to freely establish a distinctive way of life that other
21

Many authors have published histories of the Mormons generally and of Mormon
polygamy in particular. A very good general history written by Mormon historians is
LEONARD J. ARRINGTON AND DAVIS BITTON, THE MORMON EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF
THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS (1979). A useful history of polygamy by a Mormon author is
RICHARD S. VAN WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY (1989). Probably the most
widely respected general history of the Mormons is by a non-Mormon: JAN SHIPPS,
MORMONISM: THE STORY OF A NEW RELIGIOUS TRADITION (1987). Two especially erudite
histories by non-Mormon authors come from the literary critic HAROLD BLOOM, THE
AMERICAN RELIGION: THE EMERGENCE OF THE POST-CHRISTIAN NATION (1992), and the
legal historian SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002). Finally, for an
excellent examination of the politics of Mormon polygamy in early twentieth-century
America, see KATHLEEN FLAKE, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: THE
SEATING OF SENATOR REED SMOOT, MORMON APOSTLE (2004).
22
Hence the common appellation “LDS,” which stands for “Latter-day Saints.”
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communities had found so threatening and offensive.”23 Polygamy
continued to be a central if not widespread24 part of this “distinctive way of
life”; church members referred to plural marriage as “The Principle,” and
the church officially acknowledged the practice as part of its doctrine in
1852.
Joseph Smith had boldly preached to his followers that polygamous
marriage was “the most holy and important doctrine ever revealed to man
on the earth,”25 a sacred tradition rooted in the Old Testament, a practice
central to the full restoration of Christ’s true church, and a solemn ritual that
“sealed” a man to each of his wives for all eternity. This theological
justification for plural marriage, enabled by Smith’s invocations of both Old
and New Testament doctrines, served to support the Mormons’ firmly held,
officially published belief that polygamy, so integral a part of their exercise
of religion in Christian America, surely would be protected by the “divinely
inspired”26 U.S. Constitution. In the words of one Mormon publicist:
23

Edwin B. Firmage, Religion and the Law: The Mormon Experience in the
Nineteenth Century, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 765, 771 (1991).
24
Actually, a relatively small percentage of the Mormon community entered into
plural marriage. See C. Peter Magrath, Chief Justice Waite and the ‘Twin Relic’: Reynolds
v. United States, 18 VAND. L. REV. 507, 519, n.53 (1965). Nonetheless, polygamy became
a central doctrinal, social, and later political, issue for Mormons in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, polygamy was practically significant because, as has been variously observed,
“by and large, the polygamists were also the Mormons’ leaders.” Hence the successful
prosecution of polygamists “served to paralyze Mormon society by removing its
leadership.” See, e.g., Firmage, supra note 23, at 775. An expanded version of Firmage’s
analysis is presented in the first legal history of the Mormon experience, E. FIRMAGE AND
R. MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 1830-1900 (1988).
25
From a sworn statement made in 1874 by William Clayton, who had been private
secretary to Joseph Smith and who had first transcribed Joseph Smith’s revelation on plural
marriage. James L. Clayton, The Supreme Court, Polygamy and the Enforcement of Morals
in Nineteenth-Century America: An Analysis of Reynolds v. United States, 7 DIALOGUE: A
J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 46, 48, n.13 (Winter 1979). See also BLOOM, supra note 21, at
109.
26
See, e.g., Noel B. Reynolds, The Doctrine of an Inspired Constitution, in BY THE
HANDS OF WISE MEN: ESSAYS ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1-28 (Ray C. Hillam, ed.,
1979). This anthology, comprised of essays by Mormon scholars and church leaders,
explores the basic Mormon belief in the inspired nature of the U.S. Constitution. It seems
ironic that late twentieth-century Mormons would extol the inspired status of a national
Constitution that had effectively been used against them a century earlier. On the other
hand, orthodox Mormons would maintain that, as expressed both by church president John
Taylor in 1879, infra note 56, and by the contributors to the volume mentioned here,
Mormons have always held great reverence for the U.S. Constitution, and that it is only the
erroneous interpretation and application of that founding document to which they have
objected at different moments in American history. It complicates this issue further that
the LDS Church has prohibited polygamy since the church officially ceased the practice in
1890. As I shall discuss in Part II of this article, while today’s Mormon church conducts
itself strictly by that 1890 policy, such a straightforward, diplomatic position on polygamy
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The constitution and laws of the United States being founded
upon the principles of freedom, do not interfere with
marriage relations, but leave the nation free to believe in and
practice the doctrine of a plurality of wives, or to confine
themselves to the one wife system, just as they choose.27
Despite the persecution that had driven them westward, the Mormons were
confident that they could safely practice their religion in the Utah desert,
where they could build and populate God’s kingdom.
American society, by and large, did not share this view. Unlike the
increasingly common present-day image of Mormons as honest, frugal, hard
working, and prosperous (an image that most contemporary Mormons
cultivate), many nineteenth-century Americans, like some today, perceived
Mormons as a bizarre cult of religious fanatics who had rejected
conventional Christianity to form an insular spiritual community based on
an exclusive and ambitious theology.28 Mormons called themselves
“Saints,” and non-believers, “Gentiles”;29 Mormons believed in modernday revelations, visiting angels and golden plates, and the possibility of
eventual godhood; and, most sensational of all, Mormons practiced
polygamy.
II. THE NARRATIVE BATTLE OVER THE
LEGITIMACY OF MORMON POLYGAMY
No Western nation is as religion-soaked as ours, where nine
out of ten of us love God and are loved by him in return.
That mutual passion centers our society and demands some
understanding, if our doom-eager society is to be understood
obscures a far more conflicted historical experience for the evolving nineteenth-century
Mormon church during its roughly fifty-year polygamous period.
27
Young, supra note 11, at 45-46. See also Clayton, supra note 25, at 49.
28
Magrath, supra note 24, at 514.
29
In both doctrine (i.e., as God’s chosen people) and experience (i.e., persecution and
exodus), Mormons identify with the Israelites of the Old Testament. Mormons still
occasionally refer to themselves as “Saints,” though rarely to non-Mormons as “Gentiles,”
which would seem consistent with the end of persecution and the general Mormon trend
toward assimilation of mainstream American social and cultural norms over the last
hundred years. See, e.g., Armand L. Mauss, Assimilation and Ambivalence: The Mormon
Reaction to Americanization, 22 DIALOGUE: A J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 30 (Spring 1989);
Martha S. Bradley, Changed Faces: The Official L.D.S. Position on Polygamy, 1890-1990,
14 SUNSTONE: MORMON EXPERIENCE, SCHOLARSHIP, ISSUES, AND ART 26 (1990); How
Mormons Cope with ‘Deterioration in Morals,’ U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, December
19, 1977; GUSTIVE O. LARSON, THE AMERICANIZATION OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD (1971);
Clayton, supra note 25, at 58; BLOOM, supra note 21, at 107, 256.
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at all.30
– Harold Bloom
Before discussing examples of nineteenth-century narratives of Mormon
polygamy, I think it important to establish the theoretical framework in
which I will “read” those narratives. This calls for a brief discussion of the
critical concepts that inform my analysis – narrative, reading, textuality, and
rhetoric. I will define and illustrate my understanding of these and related
ideas in Sections A and B, after which I will devote Sections C and D to
analyzing cultural and legal narratives of polygamy in nineteenth-century
America.
A. NARRATIVE, TEXTUALITY, AND
“FUNDAMENTALIST” VERSUS “LITERARY” READING
The endless variety of definitions and uses of narrative – as a style, a
trope, a theme, a discursive method – reflects the protean usefulness of
narrative in human communication. The philosopher and literary critic
Roland Barthes has argued that every reader of a given narrative or text is
necessarily a reader of countless layers of overlapping narratives or texts,
just as every reader is also a writer and re-writer, through reading, of
consequent, related texts. In a seminal essay on the nature of narrative,
Barthes articulates what Porter Abbott calls “[p]erhaps the fullest statement
31
regarding the universality of narrative among humans” :
The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first
and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves
distributed amongst different substances – as though any
material were fit to receive man’s stories. Able to be carried
by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving
images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these
substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale,
novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime,
painting (think of Carpaccio’s Saint Ursula), stained-glass
windows, cinema, comics, news items, conversation.
Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms,
narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every
society; it begins with the very history of mankind and there
nowhere has been a people without narrative. All classes, all
human groups, have their narratives, enjoyment of which is
very often shared by men with different, even opposing,
30
31

BLOOM, supra note 21, at 30.
H. PORTER ABBOTT, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO NARRATIVE 1 (2002).
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cultural backgrounds. Caring nothing for the division
between good and bad literature, narrative is international,
transhistorical, transcultural: it is simply there, like life
itself.32
Although Barthes’ definition emphasizes the innumerable forms that
narrative takes, his catalogue is by no means exhaustive. For example, later
I will argue that legal argument is also a form of narrative, just as narrative,
conversely, is a form of argument, in that all narrative has a purpose and
33
works according to its own internal logic.
Furthermore, the last two sentences of Barthes‘ passage, beyond merely
anatomizing narrative as a ubiquitous meta-genre, identify the intrinsic
mediating process of narrative – narrative’s continuous role in literally
32

Roland Barthes, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in A BARTHES
READER 251-52 (Susan Sontag ed. 1982).
33
The law does not work by pure formal logic, of course. Rather, analogical and
syllogistic reasoning, when skillfully used, are valuable rhetorical tools, appealing to the
legal reader on emotional, ethical, and rational levels and thus enabling persuasion. Were
the law purely logical, it would not differ from algebra; fact pattern X would always yield
ruling Y – an ideal but not a reality in the American common law system, which is more
precisely a highly structured rhetorical system. Thus “logic” in the conventional sense is
just one of many rhetorical tools used to persuade the legal reader of the validity of the
argument being presented; the skillful legal writer might also invoke ideals such as
consistency, objectivity, neutrality, precedent, tradition, and fairness. Each of these tools
or values contains its own narratives (e.g., “the law promises us fairness, so judges must
square their decisions with some clear notion of what is fair”), and, conversely, the skillful
deployment of one or several of these narratives makes a legal argument that much more
“logical” and thus persuasive to the legal reader. For an excellent practical discussion of
the rhetorical nature of judicial opinions, see Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and
the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995). Judge Wald
concludes her essay with a telling characterization of judges as rhetoricians, observing that
within the structural constraints of the common law system,
judges still use rhetoric to maneuver. The way they present the facts, the
way they describe rules and standards of review, the way they ‘handle‘
precedent, their decisions to write separately or stay with the pack, all
provide wide avenues in which to drive the law forward. A judge’s
individual skill at working these levers of power, and doing so in a way
that does not overly antagonize colleagues, continues to have a powerful
influence on decision making. That is why, in the end, judges – as well
as their words – matter so much. Id. at 1419.
The rhetorical realities of legal reasoning and discourse undermine the traditional
assumption that law is only about reason and argument, not emotion. For insightful
interdisciplinary discussions of the complex relationship between reason and emotion, see
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes ed., 2000); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC
JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE (1995); PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL
DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 85-124 (1987).
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constituting, as well as organizing, the context in which we interpret,
understand, and represent our lived experience. Perhaps this is why the
rhetorician Robert Scholes chooses to open Protocols of Reading, his
discussion of reading as the quintessential human cognitive activity, with a
statement from Barthes related to, but pithier than, that quoted above: “And
no doubt that is what reading is: rewriting the text of the work within the
text of our lives.”34 This lyrical, evocative epigraph about reading is itself a
compact, implicit narrative (i.e., a narrative about narrative), for it contains
at least several possible referents of a compelling story: “reading,”
“rewriting,” “the text,” “the work,” “our lives.” To illustrate with a
metaphor rooted in common experience, Barthes’ tightly packed little
statement is like an icon on a computer desktop, which, if mouse-clicked,
will spring open to display its parts (“reading,” “rewriting,” etc.), which
themselves may be clicked open to reveal multiple meanings, which might
contain further elements, and so on.
Were we to click open Barthes’ sentence and proceed as described
above, we would produce an expanded version, a story that, when “played
out,” might go something like this: We are all readers, and we are always
reading, however consciously. This means that texts – let’s call the infinite
universe of them “the textuality of things” – are always around us,
inescapable, like water to fish. But that is only part of the equation,
because each time we read a text, we bring our own hermeneutical
machinery – reflecting our education, values, preferences, memories,
experiences, beliefs, feelings, convictions, commitments, ideologies – to
bear, so that what was an “objective” external text is now our own unique
version. Thus we are authors (rewriters) at the same time (always) that we
are readers; both inhere in the unending operation of reading. This
seamless cycle of reading-and-authoring is a simple yet profound way of
explaining our interior experience of life and the world around us. But
what is “the work”? This seems the most ambiguous and challenging
aspect of this little story. Is “the work” the original text, the template for
all ensuing related texts, an ideal form in the Platonic sense? (If that is so,
are not all texts to some degree templates or rewritings of all other texts?
Barthes’ statement, read in its totality, seems to suggest this.) Is “the
work” something transcendent and mysterious, ever present and intuitively
palpable, but never fully comprehensible, requiring our faith, like Joseph
Campbell’s notion of that yearned-for source of immanence to which we
35
Or is “the work” a necessary, instrumental,
give the name “God”?
interpretive metaphor, a provisional marker for all signs, which are always
“floating” somewhat due to the unanchored nature of signification itself?
34

ROBERT SCHOLES, PROTOCOLS OF READING 1 (1989).
See, e.g., JOSEPH CAMPBELL, THE MYTHIC DIMENSION: SELECTED ESSAYS 19591987 156-79, 204-19 (1997).
35
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(Is this last understanding yet another way of saying that every reading is a
rewriting?)
I have “read” at some length Barthes’ single observation on reading and
textuality because I want to demonstrate at the outset of this article several
crucial points of my definition of narrative, points that will serve as
touchstones in the pages that follow. It is worthwhile to discuss these
points now, to establish more clearly what I mean by narrative and how I
will use that definition.
First, narrative is a resident dimension of all texts – of textuality – and is
thus endemic to all human communication.36 As such, narrative functions to
mediate how we understand and represent our experiences. Abbott
observes “the presence of narrative in almost all human discourse,” such
that some theorists “place it next to language itself as the distinctive human
trait.”37 Such theorists include Frederic Jameson, who has called narrative
an “all-informing process” and “the central function or instance of the
38
human mind,” and Jean-François Lyotard, who has described narrative as
“the quintessential form of customary knowledge.”39 As these statements
suggest, narrativity is at least roughly equivalent to textuality; we are
always already both inside and outside innumerable narratives, a notion
argued forcefully in literary and linguistic theory during the last several
decades. Yet to acknowledge the inescapable mediating presence of
narrative is not to relinquish the goal of some kind of meaningful,
principled understanding of narrative.40
36

See generally SCHOLES, supra note 34; THE CRAFTY READER (2001); ABBOTT,
supra note 31. For a probing discussion of the notion of textuality in relation to the law,
see generally GOODRICH, supra note 33; see also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND
LEGAL STUDIES 37-47, 436-502 (1989); THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND
IT’S A GOOD THING TOO (1993).
37
Abbott, supra note 31.
38
FREDERIC JAMESON, THE POLITICAL UNCONSCIOUS: NARRATIVE AS A SOCIALLY
SYMBOLIC ACT 13 (1981).
39
JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION 19 (Geoff Bennington &
Brian Massumi trans., 1984).
40
In other words, just because language is “slippery” does not mean that we must give
up hope of meaningful communication. Rather, as readers, it behooves us to find
interpretive methods and principles stable enough to provide traction as we navigate texts,
especially given all of the intellectual log-rolling that characterizes postmodern thought.
And the law, perhaps more than any other discipline, relies on at least the necessary fiction
that words and their meanings remain relatively stable if we adhere to principled, consistent
forms of reading and interpretation. Relativistim is not the same thing as nihilism; what
matters is the quality of our choice and application of principles by which to read and
interpret texts. For a discussion of these issues in a focused legal context, see Pingree,
supra note 15, at 808, n.3.
A useful, concrete way to think about the rather ephemeral concepts of narrative and
textuality is to consider the metaphorical quality of all language – metaphorical in the
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In The Crafty Reader, Scholes presents a lucid, timely discussion of a
principled methodology of reading in a chapter called “Sacred Reading: A
Fundamental Problem.” He situated his discussion in the context of
contemporary religious and cultural debates among “fundamentalist” and
“literary” readers. Scholes makes these two terms opposite ends of the
“reading“ spectrum and defines them in ways useful to my discussion here.
He defines “fundamentalist“ readers as “literal“ readers – though the
“concept of ‘literal meaning‘ is itself an exaggeration, a metaphor, a
paradox. Nevertheless, it [literal meaning] is an expression of the desire to
get at the truth or meaning of a text.“41 Scholes defines “literary“ readers as
those “attempting to situate the text and the writer of these letters in their
own time, constructing, from the clues in the text, the persona of this writer,
paying particular attention to his [the author’s] self-fashioning.“42 Scholes
advocates the ideal of “crafty” reading, a kind of “selective literalism” that
takes seriously the desire of “fundamentalist“ readers to get at the truth,
while “resisting the [fundamentalist] zeal that often results in interpretive
43
leaps to an unearned certainty of meaning.“ Scholes resolves that “[t]he
crafty reader must seek an authorial intention, while recognizing that there
are many reasons why we shall never close the gap that separates us from
the author.”44
The philosopher Richard Rorty praises “literary“ reading by suggesting
that it enables us to participate in creating, rather than merely inheriting, the
narratives of ourselves and our lives. In an essay called “The Contingency
of Selfhood,“ Rorty invokes Nietzsche’s thinking about the creation of self
as a way to describe, quite poetically, a process of self-substantiation
through narrative:
In his [Nietzsche’s] view, in achieving . . . selfknowledge we are not coming to know a truth which was out
there (or in here) all the time. Rather, he saw self-knowledge
as self-creation. The process of coming to know oneself,
sense that, as an ongoing part of life, we come to understand unfamiliar concepts or things
when they are explained to us in terms of concepts or things that are familiar to us. My
mention of “mouse-clicking” Barthes‘ brief narrative to find its other meanings, and my
equating people-and-textuality to fish-and-water, are two examples. Those metaphors are
effective to the readers of this article to the extent that those readers know something about
computers and fish – an assumption I feel safe in making. Hence the essence of metaphor
is to communicate one thing in terms of something else – which, if one thinks about it, is
the central cognitive process at work in any communication, however pedestrian. For an
excellent, common sense discussion of the metaphorical nature of language, see GEORGE
LAKOFF AND MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
41
SCHOLES, supra note 36, at 219.
42
Id. at 238.
43
Id. at 219.
44
Id. at 230.
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confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s causes home,
is identical with the process of inventing a new language –
that is, of thinking up some new metaphors. For any literal
description of one’s individuality, which is to say any use of
an inherited language-game for this purpose, will necessarily
fail. One will not have traced that idiosyncrasy home but
will merely have managed to see it as not idiosyncratic after
all, as a specimen reiterating a type, a copy or replica of
something which has already been identified. To fail as a
poet – and thus, for Nietzsche, to fail as a human being – is
to accept somebody else’s description of oneself, to execute
a previously prepared program, to write, at most, elegant
variations on previously written poems.45
While using a somewhat different set of terms, Rorty is nonetheless
concerned with how we respond to the mediating narratives of our lives –
literally, the inherited words, concepts, paradigms, histories, and ideologies
that constitute the thinking-and-expressing medium of our experience.
Rorty asserts that although none of us chooses the “hand we are dealt,“ our
formative community or communities, each of us has the agency and power
to determine how to “play our hand“ in original ways – how to achieve a
meaningful degree of personal autonomy. Indeed, Rorty contends that, in
confronting the contingent forms of our own construction and ongoing
mediation, we may achieve even more than a meaningful kind of selfrealization – an “owned” if inherited subjectivity; we may move toward
genuine autonomy by actually undoing the inherited architecture of our
subjectivity and rebuilding ourselves through narrative. As he puts it, “the
only way to trace home the causes of one’s being as one is would be to tell a
story about one’s causes in a new language.”46
As if taking her cue from Scholes and Rorty, the philosopher Honi
Fern Haber characterizes this “literary“ perspective on narrativity as a kind
of enlightened compromise, a critical antidote to the kinds of dangerously
“fundamentalist“ narratives that I will discuss later in this article:
There is no view from nowhere. We can never leave all our
prejudices behind and operate from a wholly disinterested
standpoint, but our prejudices become dangerous only when
they are dogmatic, kept hidden from view and not open to
discussion. . . . We cannot think or speak, much less act, in
any purposeful manner without having structured our world
45
46

RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 27-28 (1989).
Id. at 28.
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and our interests in some heuristically useful way. Without
some notion of structure (unity) and some allowance for a
legitimate recognition of similarities between ourselves and
others, there can be no subject, community, language,
culture.47
In her own terms, Haber here engages two critical aspects of
narrative and their implications for the paradox of autonomy and
community: the impossibility of standing outside narrative
textuality; the imperative of remaining mindful that rhetorical
strategies of narrative, neutral in the abstract, will carry moral
implications and political consequences when deployed in the
service of living narrative; and the need to recognize our common
values in order to reason together to navigate our differences as
autonomous individuals. Indeed, recognizing the impossibility of
neutral narration, rather than undermining the credibility of the
process or the narrator, actually frees its readers to consider more
realistic, meaningful avenues of evaluation. In contrast to the
“literary“ methodologies of Scholes, Rorty, and Haber, of course, is
the more common human tendency toward “fundamentalist“
narrative, which often produces a problem I will call “rhetorical
reductivism.“
B. THE “FUNDAMENTALIST“ PROBLEM OF “RHETORICAL REDUCTIVISM“
During the 1860 Congressional debate about Mormon polygamy,
Congressman McClernand of Illinois laid down this warning:
As to polygamy, I charge it to be a crying evil; sapping not
only the physical constitution of the people practicing it,
dwarfing their physical proportions and emasculating their
energies, but at the same time perverting the social virtues,
and vitiating the morals of its victims. . . . It is a scarlet
whore. It is a reproach to the Christian civilization; and
deserves to be blotted out.48
Although this kind of righteous rhetoric was not uncommon in
nineteenth-century America generally, it appears to have been especially
typical of public feeling toward Mormons and their plural marriages.49 For
47

HONI FERN HABER, BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS: LYOTARD, RORTY, FOUCAULT
1, 5 (1994) (emphasis added).
48
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1514 (1860).
49
See Magrath, supra note 24, at 514-20.
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example, around the time of Congressman McClernand’s thunderous
pronouncement, professor Frances Lieber, a leading figure in the
development of American political science, denounced Mormonism as a
“repulsive fraud” and a “wicked idea”;50 not long thereafter, a prominent
clergyman in Chicago declared that “Mormonism ought to be
dynamited”;51 and elsewhere, social commentators popularized the idea that
the Mormon Church was a “society for the seduction of young virgins.”52
One critic announced that Salt Lake City was “the biggest whorehouse in
the world.”53
The Mormons did not accept these public verdicts quietly. In October
1879, after Congress had acted to outlaw polygamy54 and the Supreme
Court had upheld that law and ruled that the First Amendment did not
protect plural marriage as an exercise of religion,55 Mormon Church
President John Taylor aired this response in the Church’s general
conference:
We might ask – will they derive any benefit from any course
taken against the Latter-day Saints? No! A thousand times
no!! I tell you that the hand of God will be upon them for it .
. . . We do not want them to force upon us their drinking
saloons, their drunkenness, their gambling, their debauchery
and lasciviousness. We do not want these adjuncts of
civilization.56
Just as Congressman McClernand’s moralistic diatribe against Mormon
polygamy was typical of contemporary public discourse on the issue, so
President Taylor’s indignant and equally pious rebuke was characteristic of
the Mormons’ style of return volley.
Indeed, the Mormons, already wary of the federal government because
of past conflict, had become increasingly antagonistic after Congress acted
to proscribe polygamy in 1862. Subsequently, Mormon spokesmen
frequently portrayed the “non-Mormon world . . . as wicked, adulterous and
corrupt. Church members began to describe monogamy pejoratively as ‘the
50

FRANCES LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT 320 (2d ed. 1859).
See Magrath, supra note 24, at 514 (citing RAY B. WEST, JR., KINGDOM OF THE
SAINTS 322 (1957)).
52
Id., note 24, at 515.
53
See IRVING WALLACE, THE TWENTY-SEVENTH WIFE 15 (1961), “a popular
biography of Ann Eliza Young, the stormy and apostate twenty-seventh wife of Brigham
Young.” Magrath, supra note 24, at 515, n.41.
54
The Morrill Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, sec. 1, 12 Stat. 501.
55
Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145.
56
JOHN TAYLOR, 20 JOURNAL OF DISCOURSES 316, 320-21 (1880).
51
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one-wife-system’ or ‘serial marriage’. . . .”57 John Taylor represented this
increasingly strident outlook when, in the same 1879 sermon, and without a
trace of irony, he claimed that working within the federal government were
“religious fanatics and corrupt politicians” who “would not hesitate to
sweep us off the face of the earth to get elected.”58 Then, appealing to the
basic Mormon reverence for the Constitution,59 Taylor concluded that these
politicians “care nothing about human rights, liberty, or life, if they can
bring about the results desired.”60
Public statements concerning Mormon polygamy abounded in
nineteenth-century America. What stands out about them – indeed, what
they nearly always shared, regardless of their source – was a zealous,
polarized quality, an unyielding insistence on the exclusive moral rightness
of their position. Such stark representations of polygamy might seem
inconsonant to anyone familiar with the convoluted history of plural
marriage in America; since its inception with the Mormons in the nineteenth
century, the American practice of polygamy has been, for those who have
lived it as for those who have studied it, a complex matter. This was
perhaps especially true for nineteenth-century Mormons, for whom
polygamy, while a galvanizing, purportedly spiritual way of life, was also
confusing, traumatic, and divisive.61
57

Clayton, supra note 25, at 48.
Taylor, supra note 51, at 320.
59
This basic Mormon belief in the inspired nature of the U.S. Constitution is explored
in Reynolds, supra note 26 (Hillam, ed., 1979).
60
Taylor, supra note 51, at 320.
61
Accounts of life in Mormon polygamy range from the autobiographical to the
fictional to the scholarly, and from the apologist to the excoriating to the satirical. See,
e.g., Martha Sonntag Bradley & Mary Brown Firmage Woodward, Plurality, Patriarchy,
and the Priestess: Zina D.H. Young’s Nauvoo Marriages, 20 J. OF MORMON HIST. 84
(Spring 1994); JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE
PRINCIPLE (1987); Kahlile Mehr, Women’s Response to Plural Marriage, 18 DIALOGUE: A
J. OF MORMON THOUGHT 84 (Fall 1985); VALEEN TIPPETTS AVERY AND LINDA KING
NEWELL, MORMON ENIGMA: EMMA HALE SMITH: PROPHET’S WIFE, “ELECT LADY,”
POLYGAMY’S FOE, (1984); Julie Dunfey, ‘Living the Principle’ of Plural Marriage:
Mormon Women, Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, 10 FEMINIST
STUDIES 523 (Fall 1984); ORSON SCOTT CARD, FATHER, MOTHER, MOTHER, AND MOM
AND A WOMAN OF DESTINY (1984); Bushman, ed., supra note 1, see especially Stephanie
Smith Goodson, Plural Wives, Judith Rasmussen Dushku, Feminists, and Laurel Thatcher
Ulrich, Fictional Sisters; MAURINE WHIPPLE, THE GIANT JOSHUA (1976); SAMUEL
WOOLLEY TAYLOR, FAMILY KINGDOM (1974) and I HAVE SIX WIVES: A TRUE STORY OF
PRESENT-DAY PLURAL MARRIAGE (1956); PAUL BAILEY, POLYGAMY WAS BETTER THAN
MONOTONY: ONE MAN’S MEMORIES OF MORMON PIONEER LIFE IN UTAH (1972);
STENHOUSE, supra note 10, and EXPOSE OF POLYGAMY IN UTAH: A LADY’S LIFE AMONG
THE MORMONS (1872); MRS. JENNIE A. FROISETH, THE WOMEN OF MORMONISM, OR THE
STORY OF POLYGAMY AS TOLD BY THE VICTIMS THEMSELVES (1887); JENNIE A.
BARTLETT, ELDER NORTHFIELD’S HOME; OR SACRIFICED ON THE MORMON ALTAR, A
STORY OF THE BLIGHTING CURSE OF POLYGAMY (1883); ANN ELIZA YOUNG, WIFE #19, A
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The experiential complexity of polygamy is precisely what I will
emphasize in this section, contrasting the recorded reality of this unwieldy
social phenomenon with the moralistic, simplifying perspectives that fueled
a fierce narrative battle between the Mormons, on the one hand, and the
U.S. government and much of the American public, on the other. In this
narrative battle, each side tended to present argument-narratives of the other
that invoked grand ideologies and thus obscured the nuanced reality of the
experience, further polarizing the public debate by narrowing the scope of
possible meanings about life in polygamy.
In particular, I want to consider the function and implications of this
kind of narrative process, in which each side sought legitimacy for its vision
of American religious identity by representing polygamy in morally
simplistic terms and images for purposes of gaining ethical leverage in the
ongoing public dialectic. How, and why, did this sort of fundamentalist
narrative process – an example of rhetorical reductivism – succeed in
producing the predominant American moral narrative about polygamy? Of
course, all representations – all narratives – inevitably reduce their subject
matter in the sense that narratives must impose some kind of order on the
unruliness of experience, with language always an approximation of what is
intended.62 Thus I am talking about a matter of degree in my discussion of
the kind of narrative produced by rhetorical reductivism. Still, because this
kind of overweening, two-dimensional narrative tends to be common and
influential as an element of public discourse, I think it worth examining as
part of my analysis of narrative and the desire for cultural legitimacy. Why
did partisans in the public debate over polygamy depict so complex a
cultural and religious phenomenon in such singular, imperious moral terms?
How did the innumerable authors of these dueling narratives, all invoking,
to some degree, the institutional voices of God and state, effectively divest
the experience of polygamy of any moral ambiguity? More generally, how
might we explain the collective impulse to deploy rhetorical reductivism in
representing socially divisive issues so as to maintain an established moral
order, often at remarkable intellectual cost?
Of course, unyielding language such as that used by Congressman
McClernand or church President Taylor often has characterized public,
official, and institutional representations of nettlesome social issues in
American life. In fact, once we account for a century’s worth of linguistic
LIFE IN BONDAGE, A FULL EXPOSE OF MORMONISM (1875); MARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE
AMONG THE MORMONS: A NARRATIVE OF MANY YEARS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE, BY THE
WIFE OF A MORMON ELDER, RECENTLY FROM UTAH (1855).
62
This does not contradict the notion of textuality; to be inescapably inside the
medium of language does not preclude the equally inescapable, ongoing necessity of
forging, for external (e.g., social, political, legal, cultural) purposes, meaningful
communication within that medium – something like the need to continually repair and
orient one’s sailboat while sailing in various weather conditions.
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shift, we might find it difficult to distinguish the bellicose statements I have
quoted from the holy rhetoric we are served today on controversial public
issues – abortion, drugs, pornography, affirmative action, and
homosexuality, to name a few. But often such grandiose language is, to risk
an oxymoron, grandly reductive, invoking sweeping authority to preempt
doubt or, as Scholes asserts, to conceal conflict or disagreement. In these
ways rhetorical reductivism prevents meaningful public discussion, for it
blinds us to the ethical and experiential complexity of a social practice like
polygamy.
Still, we should not be surprised that such binary rhetoric mediates
public accounts of controversial social issues; perhaps just this kind of
simplification is necessary to repress or otherwise manage – to order in an
acceptable way – the public and personal anxiety that attends controversial
issues. Indeed, I suggest that righteous, simplistic public responses to
controversial issues are tokens of anxiety, signs of an underlying
ambivalence that emerges when we are forced to consider difficult
questions about who we are, individually and collectively.63
63

Regarding the markedly divisive effects (including the rhetorical reductivism I posit
here) that certain matters of social controversy tend to produce, sociologist Jerome
Skolnick offers a useful theory of how people process controversial social issues. Jerome
H. Skolnick, The Social Transformation of Vice, 51 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 9
(Winter 1988). Skolnick has long studied behavior that mainstream society views as “vice”
– gambling, drugs, adultery, and prostitution, for example. Id. at 10. He suggests that
public controversy about such issues stems from our moral ambivalence towards them, so
that vice is not merely or exclusively “evil or immoral” behavior, but rather conduct that
connotes “pleasure and popularity, as well as wickedness.” Id. Hence the claim about
moral ambivalence, for vice “is conduct that a person may enjoy and deplore at the same
time.” Id. This theory of vice offers interesting possibilities for our analysis of narratives
about the Mormon polygamy controversy.
For example, given that Mormon polygamy was genuinely controversial in nineteenthcentury America, we may read rhetorically reductive responses to polygamy as a possible
indication of dividedness and uncertainty, not only within those who criticized polygamy,
but also within those who engaged in it. Indeed, this view of social behavior enables us
meaningfully to critique what we might think of as a whole dialectic of vice about Mormon
polygamy – that is, engagement by someone in the practice of polygamy, public reactions
against that engagement, counter-response and justification, and so on. In a sense, this
broad, open-ended notion of vice helps us address the very problem at issue here –
simplistic, two-dimensional analysis – as we work to understand the meaning of reductive
representations of social controversy, for it allows us to view mainstream definitions of
vice, not merely as straightforward (i.e., literal-fundamentalist) statements of political
affiliation or identity, but also, in Skolnick’s term, as a sign of deeper “cultural
contradiction.” Id. at 11.
This may seem just an academic version of the self-fulfilling cliché “me thinks thou
dost protest too strongly,” or “homophobia conceals a latent homosexual desire.” Yet it
seems indisputable that these worn maxims carry a kernel of truth about why people tend to
feel unusually strongly about certain issues. How else to explain a fierce attack on a
relatively unknown other, unless we at least recognize that the speaker gives a damn one
way or another? Polygamy mattered, for good or ill, to those who engaged so extensively
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C. CULTURAL NARRATIVES OF MORMON POLYGAMY

Polygamy was repugnant to mainstream American values regarding the
configuration and politics of marriage,64 and public response was fierce. In
1856, for instance, the first Republican Party platform proclaimed “both the
right and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those
twin relics of barbarism – Polygamy and Slavery.65 This statement reflected
the common fear that polygamy, like slavery, would spread to the
territories. Polygamy had spread to the Utah territory, of course, but
perhaps more interesting for our purposes here is that some Americans
linked the narrative of polygamy with that of slavery, equating the
ostensibly consensual practice of the former with the undeniably coercive
practice of the latter. Novelist and social activist Harriet Beecher Stowe
spoke for many who viewed plural marriage as anything but consensual;
polygamy was merely a different kind of “degrading bondage, . . . a cruel
slavery whose chains have cut into the very hearts of thousands of our
66
sisters.” And Jennie Froiseth, the well known author of The Women of
Mormonism, or the Story of Polygamy as Told by the Victims Themselves,
declared that “[t]he cornerstone of polygamy is the degradation of woman,
and it can flourish only where she is regarded and treated as a slave.”67
In the face of this harsh public narrative of Mormon polygamy as
women’s serfdom, the Church dug in its heels, repeating its institutional
narrative about the role of women through a series of official statements
that did nothing to refute the public impression that Mormon wives,
polygamous or otherwise, lived in servitude to their husbands. On the
contrary, the Church seemed bent on reinforcing the general Victorian
in excoriating or exalting it, and the evidence is in the telling.
Skolnick’s theory is also helpful to us if we want to understand the dynamic
relationship between vice and culture – between what is publicly represented and what is
personally felt and experienced – because the theory gives us one principled way to read
narratives about polygamy in more of a literary, rather than a literal-fundamentalist, mode.
That is, Skolnick’s interest in searching for signs of “cultural contradiction” is precisely to
emphasize the possible ambiguity of the subtext – to look beyond cleanly drawn lines of
simplistic moral representation to the underlying complexity of a controversial social
practice and its intricate relations to history, circumstance, ideology and will.
64
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON, 253-60 (1992). In an incisive
commentary, Posner suggests that polygamy threatened the ideal of “companionate”
marriage that anchors western notions of monogamy.
65
PORTER AND JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1960 27 (1961). This
hard line on polygamy appeared again in the Party’s 1876 platform, and in 1880 the
Republicans called for the elimination of polygamy and, if necessary, the militarily
enforced separation of “the political power from the ecclesiastical power of the so-called
Mormon church.” Id.
66
Stenhouse, supra note 10, at vi.
67
Sheldon, supra note 11, at 121 (quoting Young, supra note 11, at 11).
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narrative of women as subject to male authority. For example, in 1852, at
the behest of Brigham Young, Church Apostle Orson Pratt prepared
“Celestial Marriage,” a lengthy defense of polygamy that coincided with the
Church’s 1852 public announcement of plural marriage. Pratt, probably the
Church’s chief apologist for polygamy, characterized the woman’s place in
the family in distinctly Pauline terms:
The husband is the head of the family, and it is his duty to
govern his wife or wives, and the children, according to the
laws of righteousness; and it is the duty of the wife to be
subject unto him in all things, even as the church is subject
unto Christ.68
That such patriarchal pronouncements echoed the familiar New Testament
metaphor of Christ’s church as a “body” seems to have been an attempt at
theological justification of polygamy through the invocation of a wellknown, orthodox Christian image – one in which patriarchal order was
unobjectionable.
Yet the Mormons’ expansion of the well-known narrative of Christ’s
church “body” to include polygamy offended mainstream Christians, much
as, in principle, the attempt to include same-sex unions within the grand
narrative of traditional marriage would offend many Americans more than a
century later. Indeed, the Mormons’ revised narrative of the patriarchal
family order undoubtedly contributed to the popular notion that Mormons,
regardless of their theological justifications, had constructed their
polygamous system to imitate “the Oriental concubines, in which the
women were near-slaves.”69 Clearly, the public embrace of Paul’s “body of
Christ” narrative did not also yield acceptance of the radical departure from
convention that polygamy represented. Joseph Singer has observed that the
persuasion process turns on whether the speaker succeeds in compelling the
audience to recognize or discover common ground (e.g., shared values) with
a person or position that the audience initially does not support.70 This
conception of persuasion has its limits, however: the nineteenth-century
American public’s “discovery” or “recognition” of values already held
about marriage decidedly did not lead many to accept the argument, implicit
in the Mormons’ narrative of Christ’s body, that a significant deviation
from monogamy was legitimate, even if rooted in selective Old Testament
precedent.
68
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This particular clash of narratives is worth considering a little further, as
it raises an important point about cultural legitimacy. Generally speaking,
the public read Mormon polygamy within a narrative of slavery; that is,
people generally were persuaded that Mormon plural marriage fettered and
devalued women in ways sufficiently analogous to how slavery fettered and
devalued black Americans that the slavery narrative should include
polygamy as well as the southern institution of owning and using black
people as property. The Mormons, on the other hand, read their practice of
polygamy as divinely inspired, part of several otherwise legitimate
nineteenth-century American narratives: the narrative of reverence for the
prophets of the Old Testament, some of whom had had plural wives; the
narrative of devotion to the Apostle Paul’s patriarchal New Testament
teachings that made women subservient to men; and the narrative that the
Constitution, divinely inspired, protected distinct religious practices like
polygamy, themselves inspired by God.
Each set of narratives served to legitimize the cultural identity of its
proponents, which in this situation amounted to being obedient to the
expressed doctrines of the Christian God, and thus legitimate in the eyes of
that God. Such a starkly binary clash of narratives, often both the source
and the product of rhetorical reductivism, meant a zero sum game as to
legitimacy in the eyes of one or the other audience (Mormon or American
public). That is, narrative that seeks to legitimize the cultural identity – and
thus the worldview – of the speaker often serves, just as effectively, to delegitimize the cultural identity of the “other” in the narrative battle. This
should not be surprising; these binary functions are typically inseparable,
flip sides of the same coin: a narrative that undermines the cultural
legitimacy of a certain person or group will almost certainly have the effect,
whether intended by a specific author or communicated as a more diffuse
cultural sensibility, of legitimizing the position of the author.
Nevertheless, the phenomenon of “zero sum” legitimacy will operate
roughly to the extent that the narratives in conflict are literalfundamentalist, binary narratives, leaving little room for hermeneutic
negotiation. And although this need not be the case when narratives clash,
it seems that the greater the perceived religious stakes, the greater the
human tendency to batten down the rhetorical hatches to ensure a sense of
certainty and legitimacy, even if (or, in Scholes’ view, especially if)71 that
rhetorical strategy expresses itself in the cloak of highly figurative
language.
Some Mormon plural wives would likely have disputed the typically
categorical characterizations of their polygamous lifestyle, for most of their
first-hand accounts suggest that the experience of polygamy was
71
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heterogeneous.72 Historian Kahlile Mehr concludes his detailed survey of
such women’s personal narratives with this observation:
Plural marriage was a complex phenomenon in both
theology and practice.
It was no less complex
psychologically. Some LDS women ardently accepted it as a
divine principle. Others viewed it as an unwelcome but
necessary sacrifice to achieve salvation. A few loathed it.
There were women who coaxed reluctant husbands to take
an additional wife. Others quietly acquiesced--either in
initial discussions or when presented with a fait accompli,
and still others left the household rather than accept a sister
wife. Sometimes the inner and outer persons were in
conflict. Inwardly repelled and outwardly obedient, many
women faced a struggle that for some led to triumphant self73
control and for others to shattering disillusionment.
Notwithstanding the rhetorical reductivism at work in most public
narratives about polygamy, the experience itself, like any experience
involving intimate social relationships, did not lend itself to transparent or
uniform interpretation at either a personal or a symbolic level.
Still, many Americans derived their impression of Mormon polygamy
almost exclusively from the nightmarish personal narratives published in
popular books like Jennie Bartlett’s Elder Northfield’s Home; or Sacrificed
74
on the Mormon Altar, A Story of the Blighting Curse of Polygamy. The
New York Times also contributed significantly to this national impression,
consistently inveighing against Mormons and polygamy. In 1882, for
example, after The World had published a benign report on the Mormons,
the Times reprinted the article, followed by the demand, “What can [the
editor’s] object be in making his paper the apologist for a false and
degrading religion?”75 According to the Times, the editor of the World must
have been angling to provide himself “with as many wives as he now holds
shares of stock.”76 A year later, after many Protestant churches had
organized mass meetings in most large American cities to draft resolutions
urging Congress to take further action against the Mormons, The Times’
editorial page seemed to relish the chance to point a finger at the Mormons,
72
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calling them “a class of sinners . . . providentially supplied for the purpose
of enabling eloquent ministers to preach powerful sermons without
offending any possible pewholder.”77
Editorial page hyperbole aside, it says much about public sentiment that
The New York Times, arguably the national journalistic voice of record, felt
confident speaking for “any possible pewholder” in presenting a narrative
of Mormons as so immoral that God must have produced them to give all
other Christians a reason to unite in opposition. To use William Handley’s
78
phrase about growing up Mormon, the Times’ characterization signifies a
“totalizing narrative” among Americans regarding the Mormons, one in
which, morally speaking, there appeared to be no middle ground.
Such sweeping condemnations of polygamy, like the Church’s dogmatic
pronouncements, created a morally stark dialectic of public narratives that
could only have obscured the complex nature of the polygamous
experience, especially for the Mormon women asked to embrace it.
Thoughtful voices were few, but notable. For example, John Stuart Mill,
perhaps annoyed with the sheer volume of ridicule applied to Mormon
polygamists, or alert to the hypocrisy of a larger culture blind to its own
conventional forms of misogyny and marital inequality, called for a more
careful approach to the Mormon question. Marveling at “the language of
downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country
whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of
Mormonism,” Mill argued a kind of “pro-choice” position on the issue of
plural marriage:
It must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary
on the part of the women concerned in it . . . as is the case
with any other form of marriage institution. . . . I cannot
admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to
step in and require that a condition of things with which all
who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be
put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some
thousands of miles distant who have no part or concern in
79
it.
From our vantage point, Mill’s position may seem somewhat archaic, even
gratuitous. That is, whether Mormon women were making a genuinely
voluntary choice in accepting plural marriages now seems highly debatable
77
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in the glare of the post-modern universe, where the idea of the autonomous
will of the liberal subject, and the machinery of individual consent, have
been considered increasingly problematic.80 Yet Mill, for one, was
consistent on the question of gender equality, having published writings that
opposed sex discrimination, including the sex discrimination of nineteenthcentury marriage laws.81
Moreover, to fairly evaluate the nineteenth-century Mormon
woman’s choice to accept plural marriage, we must consider the difficult
and complex implications of that choice in historical context.82 Martha
Bradley and Mary Woodward have pointed out that for nineteenth-century
Mormon women, choosing to believe in the divine calling of Joseph Smith
was itself a kind of threshold paradigm choice of epistemological
significance, which narrowed ensuing practical decisions. In this sense,
polygamy was another version of the classic narrative of faith versus
reason:
A feminist interpretation of . . . plural marriage sees that,
although women were willing to restructure their lives along
new and often radical lines, they believed Joseph Smith was
expressing the will of God by recreating patriarchal
precedents from the Bible. Mormon patriarchy reflected his
attempt to redefine, reorder, and maintain social control
through male priesthood. He did this by invoking the moral
authority of revelation, priesthood power, and the principle
of obedience. We must not underestimate the impact of
80
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Smith’s prologue of visions and angels in his private
instructions to young women. If they believed, the logical
consequence was their total submission to his judgment, his
authority, and his power. If they did not believe this, there
was no way for them to remain members of his church.83
Bradley and Woodward further observe that for nineteenth-century
American women generally, marriage was a categorical decision of
inestimable impact, “the first moment in their adult lives when they were
empowered. Choosing to marry or not to marry, and whom to marry,
radically changed the boundaries of their lives.”84
Given the dramatic nature of the marriage decision, it becomes
comprehensible that a woman might have entered plural marriage out of
what anthropologist Rex Cooper has called “a real fear for survival.”85
Indeed, if a woman came to invest her belief in what she felt was the
grandeur of Mormon theology, accepting polygamy “might be regarded as
an attempt to maintain Mormon group identity and provide for Mormon
salvation despite any eventuality.”86 Were these women sophisticated
enough to be “tracing their own causes home,”87 or were they making lifealtering choices heavily mediated by their belief in Joseph Smith’s narrative
of sacrifice and salvation? Although the latter seems the more likely
scenario, the sheer novelty of plural marriage for most of these women
suggests that there was, at least for some, something of “telling a story
about one’s causes in a new language” – that is, in the radical choice to
83
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accept life as a plural wife.
Of course, the clash of narratives never ceases. For instance, somewhat
ironically, some Mormon women also linked these concerns about survival
and identity to what they viewed as a larger, more progressive sensibility
about their religion: “[w]hen they chose to enter a patriarchal religious
community, they did so because they believed that the gender system was
organized around family-centered and woman-oriented values. The
network of familial relationships created through plural marriage created a
new and unique sense of community, of family and of self.”88 From this
perspective, many Mormon women saw polygamy as “a new social
institution that they were able to accept by redefining it in terms of a female
89
world view.”
These progressive images of self and community reflect more a
narrative of nineteenth-century American utopian yearning than they do the
predominant nineteenth-century Christian narrative of patriarchal order.
And despite the obvious contextual differences, such images seem similar to
what Catherine MacKinnon has suggested is the Sisyphean narrative of
feminist methodology – to make possible the “expression of women’s
situation, in which the struggle for consciousness is a struggle for world: for
a sexuality, a history, a culture, a community, a form of power, an
90
experience of the sacred.”
Some Mormon women chose ways to experience the polygamy
narrative as one that enabled expanded identity and self-empowerment; as
discussed at the opening of this article, such women engaged in a surprising
political activism that made patriarchal Church declarations seem
incongruous with these women’s real experiences and opinions. For
example, Mormon women organized the successful campaign for suffrage
in Utah, which left anti-Mormon critics perplexed as to “why the ‘last
outpost of barbarism’ should have extended the vote to women in 1870,
fifty years before the nation adopted the Nineteenth Amendment and
decades before women’s suffrage had acquired respectability elsewhere.”91
As discussed in the opening of this article, some Mormon women also
published the Woman’s Exponent,92 a journal that was decidedly outspoken
on political and social matters of the day. One editorial said this of the
relative importance of men in women’s lives:
Is there then nothing worth living for, but to be petted,
88
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humored, and caressed, by a man? That is all very well as
far as it goes, but that man is the only thing in existence
worth living for I fail to see. . . . And when men see that
women can exist without their being constantly at hand, that
they can learn to be self-reliant or depend upon each other
for more or less happiness, it will perhaps take a little of the
conceit out of some of them.93
The idea of depending “upon each other for more or less happiness” makes
sense within the “empowerment” narrative of plural marriage when one
considers the significant personal implications of plural marriage for a
Mormon woman:
. . . the practical requirements of living as plural wives
challenged the limiting stereotype of women accepted by
civilized America. A plural wife could not be the helpless,
fainting, protected female or she would likely faint alone.
Plural wives often had to look to themselves rather than their
husbands for financial support and physical labor. For
practical purposes many were more like widows than
traditional wives. The regular absence of their husbands
simplified their housekeeping chores, allowing them to
participate in a broader range of activities than their eastern
sisters. In one of the neatest ironic contradictions of the
period, the “enslaved harems” of Utah produced some of
94
America’s most efficient early feminists.
From these accounts, it is difficult not to see something of a cultural
anomaly in the complex experience of Mormon polygamous women,
notwithstanding simplistic public narratives coming from both the Church
and its critics.
Still, I am mindful that in suggesting another cultural narrative for
Mormon polygamy (an “empowerment narrative,” coexistent with the
dialectical “women-in-bondage“ and “spiritual superiority“ narratives
championed by many critics and proponents of polygamy), I am relying on
a current historical narrative constructed by present-day Mormon feminist
95
scholars. I point this out because of the importance, in doing “literary”
reading, of candidly “tracing the causes of one’s own narrative,”96 as it
93
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were.
I believe this approach enriches “literary” and avoids
“fundamentalist” reading, because it acknowledges the real ambiguities that
reside in a given narrative.
Here, for example, the motives and values of the contemporary women
writing the nineteenth-century polygamy “empowerment narrative” are
quite possibly diverse and conflicted: being women, scholars, and Mormons
themselves might encourage any number of “empowerment” and “bondage”
feelings about their early Mormon counterparts, depending on the writers’
intellectual values, historical methodologies, identity politics, personal
relationships to the Mormon Church, and so on. To read the experience of
Mormon plural wives with a fundamentalist sensibility, on the other hand,
would yield a more ideologically beholden, homogenous, and settled
narrative – one more likely to conceal, however unwittingly, uncertain facts
and attitudes that do not cleanly square with the overarching, mediating
narrative being expounded.
Whatever our assessment of this contemporary “empowerment“
narrative of nineteenth-century polygamy, it is clear that some of the
women who experienced that life forged and lived by this “empowerment”
narrative. Of course, this may have been the most meaningful alternative
for women who were typically strong and educated, and often well beyond
97
Perhaps there is something apologist about the
their teenage years.
“empowerment“ narrative being told by these current Mormon scholars.
Yet is it not human nature (especially among the religious) to seek or create
narratives that justify one’s self, family, or community? This alone is not
fatal to good reading; rather, it would seem to be an inevitable aspect of
self-narration. Haber eloquently reminds us of what is truly indispensable
to the literary reader – recognizing that “there is no view from nowhere,”
that where our reading and writing energies actually matter is in remaining
vigilant and honest about our mediating backgrounds and convictions.
Thus there is no shame, nor need their be harm, in recognizing, if indeed
we see them, meaning and value in past and present “empowerment” and
“bondage” narratives of women in polygamy. I see much value, for
example, in the “empowerment” narrative constructed by late twentiethcentury Mormon feminist historians, if only because their research and
writing about the complexity of a woman’s polygamy experience produces
a literary counter-narrative to the generally sanitized, fundamentalist,
98
“unknowing” narrative of polygamy maintained by today’s mainstream
97
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LDS Church.99 And in the end, the clash of polygamy narratives across
time opens a door to more interpretive possibilities still, as well as a
glimpse of the endless, trans-historical, trans-cultural nature of narrativity.100
Mormon polygamy was not unique as an occasion in which the
complexity of women’s experience was appropriated by dominant moral
narratives of a patriarchal culture. By any account, that has been going on
since the beginning. But polygamy forced an unusually excruciating
decision on the women asked to practice it, a decision whose complexity
was seldom if ever acknowledged in the rhetorical battles waged on the
stage of public morality. As Claudia Bushman has described it:
For the women of Zion the importance of polygamy cannot
be overstressed, even though only a small proportion of the
permanent and general American irony. . . ; we may be uniquely the nation where the
knowers cannot know themselves.” Id. at 263-4.
99
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populace was directly involved. The Mormon sisters were
required to defend the Principle or leave the Church entirely.
They had to make plural marriage work to prove they were
right. The Principle, more than anything else, set up a
competition between the Mormons and the Gentiles, the first
intent on proving their righteousness and the second on
forcing the miscreant group to recant their evil ways. 101
These conditions likely guaranteed that, among nineteenth-century Mormon
women, the very choice whether to accept plural marriage, its heavy
personal consequences, and the constant rhetorical reductivism that
controlled its representation in public debate – all created an airless
atmosphere of stringent moral competition in which nuanced and
meaningful public dialogue about plural marriage, let alone about
underlying issues of family configuration, gender politics, and identity, was
virtually impossible.
The principal clash of public narratives over Mormon polygamy in
nineteenth-century America was, by any standard, fundamentalist, although
some subsidiary narratives, whether of the libertarian kind expressed by
John Stuart Mill or the communitarian-feminist kind forged by a number of
Mormon polygamous wives, occasionally lifted the camouflage of selfrighteous, disingenuously figurative oratory that concealed the
monopolistic, literalist, “through-line” of the main combatants in the
narrative battle over plural marriage.
It is only now that the ambiguous narrative of those women, at that time,
in those circumstances, is being thoughtfully reconstructed, and as such, the
narrative of women living in “the Principle” in the nineteenth century
assumes a measure of authenticity, and thus cultural legitimacy, at least
among some of us who read that narrative today, identify with conflicts and
concerns it evokes, and are compelled to think about ourselves more deeply
and to read and write our narratives more circumspectly.
D. LEGAL NARRATIVES OF MORMON POLYGAMY
Nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy was contested on the public
stage, not only through cultural narratives, but also through legal narratives
– narratives of social order preserved through the highly formalized
medium of judicial discourse. In particular, I want to examine one truly
consequential judicial narrative of polygamy: the Supreme Court’s 1879
decision in Reynolds v. United States, in which the Court upheld federal
laws illegalizing polygamy, thus declaring that the practice was not
protected as an exercise of religion under the First Amendment’s Free
101
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Exercise Clause.102
Leaving aside for now the outcome of the Court’s decision, the
Reynolds opinion is a telling narrative of the preeminence of social order
because the opinion exemplifies the dynamics and implications of judicial
rhetoric, especially the necessary acts of judicial framing of and syllogistic
reasoning about social conflicts, and the judicial bequest of cultural
legitimacy that follows from those operations. The opinion also embodies,
and is mediated by, several other powerful “authority” narratives of
American law, including the ideals of social tradition, legal precedent, value
neutrality, and principled decision-making, which serve to uphold the larger
narrative of maintaining social order. Understanding this matrix of legal
narratives is crucial to understanding how the law uniquely frames and
resolves social conflict.103
In his introduction to Law and the Order of Culture,104 Robert Post
identifies the dynamic relationship between law – in the largest sense, our
system of social order – and the ambient culture. Post argues that “social
order requires the mediation of social meaning, and that social meaning
arises through the operation of systems that are simultaneously symbolic
105
This formulation provides us with an enlarged view of
and practical.”
how law functions to both reflect and stimulate our ongoing sense of “the
order of things.”106 Michel Foucault deftly located this sense of order in the
relation between a society’s “ordering codes” and its “reflections upon
order itself” – and we could recast this relation as that between society’s
“narratives of order” and its “overarching, evolving narrative about order
107
itself.” This order-oriented framework of the law is important because it
helps us think about how the American judiciary, as the foremost formal
source of our “ordering codes,” frames social controversies so as to
maintain the larger social order.
More concretely, if “bondage instead of empowerment of women” and
“the deviant, immoral sexuality of polygamy” were salient tropes deployed
by critics of polygamy in nineteenth-century America, legal discourse on
the subject of polygamy centered on the value of the narrative of social
order. Yet how the judiciary works to regulate and maintain this narrative
102
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of order is a complicated, multi-faceted process. In executing its role at the
center of the Anglo-American common law system, the Supreme Court
labors under a truly unique rhetorical burden, constructing and presenting
its opinions, in which it publicly represents and resolves complex social
questions, in ways that maintain what it perceives to be the prevailing social
order and justify its decisions in legally legitimate terms and principles.
These terms and principles amount to compact narratives of legitimacy, for
each enables the necessary public justification of the opinion and thus adds
weight to the court’s decision as a social template – as a precedent for
future similar situations.
James Boyd White, as astute reader of judicial opinions, provides a rich
characterization of all that is at work in a judicial opinion, the highest form
of legal narrative:
The judicial opinion is a claim of meaning: it describes the
case, telling its story in a particular way; it explains or
justifies the result; and in the process it connects the case
with earlier cases, the particular facts with more general
concerns. It translates the experience of the parties, and the
languages in which they naturally speak of it, into the
language of the law, which connects cases across time and
space; and it translates the texts of the law – the statutes and
opinions and constitutional provisions – into the terms
defined by the facts of the present case. The opinion thus
engages in the central conversation that is for us the law, a
conversation that the opinion itself makes possible. In doing
these things it makes two claims of authority: for the texts
and judgments to which it appeals, and for the methods by
which it works. 108
With this critical orientation in mind, let us briefly follow the public debate
about the perceived threat of Mormon polygamy to the social and political
order of nineteenth-century America, before we turn to the Reynolds
decision itself.
In 1856, Brigham Young, in one of many such imperious
statements, declared that “[t]he sound of polygamy is a terror to the
pretended republican government. Why? Because this work is destined to
revolutionize the world and bring all under subjection.”109 Young’s
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towering predictions of social revolution were not exclusively concerned
with the governmental order, but with the larger social order as well. As
historian Michael Quinn describes it,
The Saints spoke directly to questions absorbing
many others at the time – sexuality, health, and home, but
posited polygamy as the solution to these ills. Mormon
polygamy was not simply counter-cultural, it was the highest
form of marriage relationship. The Latter-Day Saints did not
recognize the disaster if non-Mormons believed Mormon
defenses of polygamy. If polygamy was the real answer to
society’s ills, then ‘Gentiles’ had every reason to fear that
Mormon polygamy was the marriage relationship to end all
other marriage relationships.110
Official Mormon representations of polygamy were understandably
threatening, especially to those concerned with the American legal order.
Indeed, such seemingly hegemonic projections, however figuratively they
may have been intended, would lead someone like Congressman
Cradlebaugh of Nevada to issue the warning that I discussed in Chapter One
(“People in our midst . . . are building up, consolidating and daringly
carrying out a system, subversive to the Constitution and laws, and fatal to
morals and true religion.”111).
In light of such apocalyptic predictions, the public understandably
perceived Mormonism as a threat to the ideals of individualism, the
monogamous family, and the rule of law – cherished elements of the
nineteenth-century American cultural order. Historian David Brion Davis
has summarized this tension in terms quite sympathetic to the Mormon
narrative of community:
[The Mormon] gospel of work was communal rather
than individual, and they took out to the frontier with them
an organization and an outlook that was guaranteed to
alienate the selfish and violent individualists who were to
surround them. If you followed a new Enoch west in order
to build a new Zion, then you were engaged in nation
building of a kind very different from your neighbors’ mode
of enlarging the republic.112
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This incompatibility of narratives of community and individualism
characterized much of the relationship of American law to Mormon
polygamy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, fear of the
Mormon threat to the American cultural order seemed to animate the entire
public legal conversation about the Mormons.
As I have mentioned, the Mormon polygamous threat infused
Congressional debate (especially when slavery was at issue) in the 1850s
and 1860s, leading to Congressional passage of The Morrill Act in 1862,
the first of several pieces of federal legislation designed to eliminate
Mormon polygamy. The Morrill Act invalidated all Utah laws that
“‘establish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance polygamy’” and made
bigamy a crime punishable by a maximum fine of $500 and a maximum
incarceration of five years.113 Yet the Morrill Act, while “constitutionally
pure, . . . was practically worthless”114
Indeed, in a territory where three-quarters of the population was
Mormon, bigamy prosecution became a farce: “polygamists went into
hiding in the ‘Underground,’ key witnesses disappeared, plural wives
refused to testify against their husbands, and sympathetic juries would not
convict.”115 Moreover, the Civil War and Reconstruction occupied the
federal government until the mid-1870s, after which the government more
forcefully turned its attention to “the Mormon Question.” Congress
responded to President Ulysses Grant’s call for new legislation to outlaw
this “barbarism" by passing the Poland Act of 1874, which divested the
Mormon-controlled probate courts of their power to hear civil, chancery,
and criminal actions and transferred jurisdiction over all important cases to
the federal territorial courts.116
Hence the Morrill Act had little effect until 1874, when its
constitutionality was tested in the case against George Reynolds, private
secretary to Brigham Young and a practicing polygamist. That case
reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1879. Generally speaking, the Court
addressed the question of whether plural marriage, which the Mormons
asserted was essential to their religion, was protected as the free exercise of
religion guaranteed under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Specifically, the question presented to the Court was whether George
Reynolds, who was married to two women, could be prosecuted under a
117
federal bigamy law that criminalized plural marriage of any kind.
Although the Mormons expected the Court to rule in their favor, the justices
113
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made this the occasion for establishing a critical distinction in First
Amendment doctrine between religious belief and religious conduct – a
doctrinal boundary that remains valid today.118
The Reynolds opinion, authored by Chief Justice Morrison Waite, is
interesting for many reasons, but here I will focus on how Waite moved
rhetorically to frame and resolve the fundamental problem that this case
presented: the threat to social order posed by Mormon plural marriage. In
setting the context for the Court’s decision, the Chief Justice began by
problematizing the meaning of religion itself:
The word “religion” is not defined in the
Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain
its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than
to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision
[the First Amendment] was adopted. The precise point of
the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom that has been
119
guaranteed.
Waite then drew on the deepening historical and philosophical roots of First
Amendment doctrine, quoting Thomas Jefferson’s flowery formulation to
assert the crucial distinction between belief and practice:
. . . to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers
into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency,
is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious
liberty,” such that “it is time enough for rightful purposes of
civil government for its officers to interfere when principles
break out into overt acts against peace and good order.” In
these two sentences is found the true distinction between
what properly belongs to the church and what to the State. 120
Having initiated his approach to the problem of plural marriage by setting
himself firmly on Jefferson’s unassailable shoulders, Waite proceeded to
build and refine that framework, quoting Jefferson’s famous articulations
118
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that “religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God” and
“that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, not
opinions”; these axioms, Waite suggested, formed the basis for America’s
proverbial “wall of separation between church and State.”121
In this deep historical soil Waite planted a standard by which to
evaluate the problematic social practice of Mormon polygamy:
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of
the advocates of the . . . [First Amendment], it may be
accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope
and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order.122
The rhetorical decision to twice frame the problem this way – to make
subversion of good order the threshold criterion for First Amendment
protection of religious behavior – helps illuminate the subtle, easily effaced
and naturalized, but deeply significant relationship between the putatively
clean pronouncements of the American judiciary and the complex, concrete
social issues that give rise to those abstract decisions.
Let us recall Robert Post’s observation about the dynamic, if uneasy,
relationship between law and the surrounding culture in which law, our
official system of order, lives and breathes. Post emphasizes the fluid and
far-ranging interpretive possibilities that reside in judicial acts (“social order
requires the mediation of social meaning, and that social meaning arises
through the operation of systems that are simultaneously symbolic and
practical.”)123 Post’s formulation of the relationship between law and
culture, beyond acknowledging the heavy social ramifications of judicial
decisions (as opposed to, say, the less immediately pragmatic consequences
of the public utterances of literary theorists), provides an enlarged view of
how law functions both to reflect and to stimulate our evolving sense of the
order of things.
I continue to focus here on this basic sense of social order because it
helps us think about how the American judiciary, a salient source and the
primary arbiter of our ordering codes, frames cultural controversies like
polygamy so as to serve and maintain the larger social order itself (whatever
that might be), which in turn determines how particular definitions of
identity – both community and individual – may or may not legitimately
inhabit the larger culture. Thus in 1879 Chief Justice Waite could invoke
121
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well known and authoritative political, social, and moral narratives inherited
from the Founding Fathers in order to frame the legal question regarding
polygamy as a simple, if vague, query about whether it was “subversive of
good order.”
Yet having reduced the legal resolution of the problem to this single
question, Waite would not ponder the seemingly complex meanings of good
order, let alone consider what behaviors could amount to subversion of it,
even though he had paused earlier to meditate on the problem of defining
religion, something equally fundamental to the Court’s determination of
whether polygamy should receive Constitutional protection. Rather, Waite
moved directly from framing the legal question as whether polygamy was
subversive of good order to concluding, through terse historical summary,
that polygamy was indeed problematic to the established social order of
western civilization:
Polygamy has always been odious among the
northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the
establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and African
people. At common law, the second marriage was always
void . . ., and from the earliest history of England polygamy
124
has been treated as an offence against society.
Whatever one’s view of plural marriage, the Chief Justice’s reasoning here
seems somewhat conclusory and detached, suggesting that historical
precedent alone justifies what we desire in our social order and implying
that a practice such as polygamy could be accommodated only by the social
order of cultures foreign to our own.
Such one-dimensional cultural analysis, although not uncommon in
judicial discourse, raises difficult questions about what precisely the Court
meant in defining religion a la Jefferson as a “matter which lies solely
between man and his God.” Surely even this robust concept had its limits,
for Chief Justice Waite had no compunctions about condemning the faith of
those who “believed human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship,”125 just as, for example, Congressman Ward of Illinois, in an
influential Congressional debate five years before Reynolds, had seen no
valid legal distinction between Mormon polygamy, which “sacrifices
women to the lusts of men,” and those so-called “religions” in whose name
“the widow mounts the funeral pyre of India,” or for which “helpless infants
are sacrificed in the waters of the Ganges.”126 Rather, such arguments
124
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seemed secondary to the deeper anxiety that Mormon polygamy was, as the
Chief Justice had concluded, subversive of good order.
Despite the inconsistencies and selective myopia of the Reynolds
decision, from a rhetorical standpoint we see also the careful construction of
a compelling legal narrative, the telling of a story based on reasoning that
serves to justify a clear legal answer to a pressing social question in the eyes
of the story’s intended readership: e.g., “Polygamy should not receive
Constitutional protection simply because it stems from religious belief;
otherwise, any social conduct, however harmful to individuals or society at
large, would be constitutionally protected so long as that conduct was
undertaken in the service of sincere religious belief. Thus to give legal
protection to polygamy potentially jeopardizes us all in ways beyond the
specific social harm that many believe polygamy does by itself.“ Here the
author of the legal narrative, Chief Justice Waite, appeals widely to sources
of authority which he knows the audience will respect: established moral
traditions, legislative decisions, and recognized and established processes of
rational argument. In short, we see here American law’s unique blend of
rhetoric and logic, a story of core values confirmed and preserved in a
principled way.
First, in Waite’s argument for history and tradition, he gives the
follow account:
In connection with the case we are now considering,
it is a significant fact that on the 8th of December, 1788,
after the passage of the act establishing religious freedom,
and after the convention of Virginia had recommended as an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States the
declaration in a bill of rights that “all men have an equal,
natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience,” the legislature of
that State substantially enacted the statute of James I
[prohibiting polygamy], death penalty included, because, as
recited in the preamble, “it hath been doubted whether
bigamy or poligamy [sic] be punishable by the laws of this
Commonwealth.” 12 Hening’s Stat. 691. From that day to
this we think it may safely be said there never has been a
time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been
an offence against society, cognizable by the civil courts and
punishable with more or less severity.127
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In effect, Waite is saying that this behavior should be criminalized merely
because it has been so for a very long time, just as, more than a century
later, Justice Byron White would invoke tradition as a compelling ground
for upholding state laws making consensual homosexual conduct a crime.128
Next, Waite relies on popular political theory of the time to argue
that polygamy is a kind of dictatorship at the family level, which can lead
lead to a breakdown in democracy at the national level:
In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to
believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom
was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most
important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its
very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in most
civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by
law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its
fruits spring social relations and social obligations and
duties, with which government is necessarily required to
deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous
marriages are allowed, do we find principles on which the
government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests.
Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal
principle, and which, when applied to large communities,
fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that
principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.
Chancellor Kent observes that this remark is equally striking
and profound. 2 Kent, Com. 81, note (e). An exceptional
colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may
sometimes exist for a time without appearing to disturb the
social condition of the people who surround it; but there
cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of
constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of
every civil government to determine whether polygamy or
monogamy shall be the law of social life under its
dominion.129
In the end, there are reasons to admire the Chief Justice’s handiwork here.
Throughout the Reynolds opinion, Waite weaves together on the loom of
legal reasoning strands of history, tradition, legislative process and intent,
128
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and sociological theory, all to create a rhetorically sturdy fabric of argument
to support the prohibition of Mormon polygamy in order to maintain the
prevailing family order.
Yet there is more to judicial narratives than the aesthetics of the
crafting; when a court reaches one conclusion instead of any other, that
choice makes concrete things happen. Here, the Court’s story of the need to
preserve social order put George Reynolds in prison and compelled
dramatic change in a community and its social and religious practices. The
practical consequences of the Chief Justice’s framing of the polygamy
question give this decision teeth sharper and jaws more powerful than come
with most rhetorical choices. In ruling that the Constitution could not
protect Mormon polygamy because it was criminal conduct, rather than the
necessary behavioral manifestation of an unconventional belief system (and
this being a judicial decision, it indeed had to be one or the other), the Court
in 1879 performed its necessary function of framing urgent social issues in
order to determine what was legally and, at least to a refracted degree,
culturally acceptable. That this judicial function is necessary does not mean
that the justices’ concrete acts of framing are themselves immune to our
scrutiny; on the contrary, it is the very quality – the social justification and
general persuasiveness – of those framing decisions that makes a difference
to us as members of the American polity.
The late Robert Cover argued that in discursive acts such as those
discussed above, there inheres a kind of social violence,130 and Stephen
Carter has suggested that through such legally legitimate forms of rhetorical
framing, a culture may marginalize, and thus “rid itself of [the] movements .
. . and religions” that threaten its prevailing order.”131 While these ominous
claims are debatable, the fact – and the impact – of judicial framing are
undeniable. Much more could be said here about the necessary politics of
the judicial process, but for our discussion, suffice it to say that this socially
crucial judicial function – the framing of issues for legal disposition – is, as
an especially formal and practically influential version of public discourse,
also a potentially specialized medium for rhetorical reductivism. Whether
that actually is the case depends, of course, upon the quality and candor of
the judicial expression at issue, but neither the institutional authority in
which it is robed nor the immediacy of its social impact should prevent us
from seeing that, like the other forms of public discourse examined here,
judicial discourse can wield its own problematic power in the representation
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– and thus the public understanding and treatment – of social controversies
like Mormon polygamy.
To the shock of most Mormons, George Reynolds’ conviction was
upheld, and after failing to secure either a pardon from President Rutherford
Hayes or a rehearing before the Supreme Court, Reynolds went to prison in
Lincoln, Nebraska, and later in the Utah Territory. Still, the Reynolds
decision empowered Congress to punish polygamy only through the Morrill
Act, an unwieldy instrument at best. It wasn’t until 1882, with passage of
the Edmunds Act, that Congress developed a truly efficient method for
prosecuting polygamists:
[The Act made it] easier to secure bigamy
convictions by making it a crime for any male in the United
States territory merely to cohabit – not marry – with more
than one woman. It disqualified from jury service in bigamy
and cohabitation prosecutions all who believed in or
practiced either polygamy or unlawful cohabitation. In
addition, convicted bigamists and ‘cohabs,’ as they were
quickly dubbed, lost their eligibility to vote and to hold
public office.132
The results were significant: by 1893, after the Church had renounced
polygamy and prosecutions had largely ceased, “there had been 1004
convictions for unlawful cohabitation and thirty-one for polygamy.”133
The government dealt a final blow to Mormon polygamy in 1887,
when Congress passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which effectively
dissolved the Church as a corporation, allowed for the confiscation of most
Church assets, and repealed the Utah legislation granting women the right
to vote. In 1890, the Church issued “The Manifesto,” purportedly the
product of divine revelation, which promised that Church members would
cease the practice of plural marriage.134
As I suggested at the outset of this section, polygamy, like
communism or abortion or drugs or pornography, raises complex ethical
questions about who we are, which is precisely why these issues generate in
us moral ambivalence and stir in our society public controversy; it is also
why we typically yield to the intoxicating power of didactically ordered
narratives in our public representation and response. But we stand to lose
much in that kind of telling, for if the reach of our desire for mutual
understanding exceeds the grasp of our public discourse, and this because
we habitually frame the difficult moral issue as the easily decidable one,
132
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then we have learned to live in a kind of collective denial about ourselves
and each other.
III. NOTES FROM A CURRENT NARRATIVE HOLY WAR:
THE ANALOGY OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Small wonder, then, that the self is a public topic and that its
“betterment“ is regarded not just as a personal matter but
as meriting the care of those charged with maintaining a
proper moral order – the church, the school, the family, and,
of course, the state itself.135
– Jerome Bruner
The only politics that can survive an encounter with this
world, and still speak convincingly of freedom and justice
and democracy, is a politics that can encompass both the
harmonics and the dissonance. The frazzle, the rubbed raw,
the unresolved, the fragile and the fiery, and the dangerous:
These are American things. This jangle is our movement
forward, if we are to move forward; it is our survival, if we
136
are to survive.
– Tony Kushner
A. INTRODUCTION: MORMON POLYGAMY AS A WINDOW
ON THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CONTROVERSY
Throughout our history, Americans have done battle over ideas of
community and autonomy through various languages of our culture137 –
including religion, politics, sexuality, and, most certainly, the law. Of
course, ideas of community and autonomy – of the collective and the
individual – have been in tension throughout the history of western
civilization, particularly from the Enlightenment through modernity and
135
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postmodernity. In recent decades, for example, this ongoing public
conversation about community and autonomy has manifest itself with
special intensity in the work of liberals, like John Rawls,138 and
communitarians, like Michael Sandel.139
Contemporary cultural debates about the relative virtues of autonomy
and community are, effectively, variations on the fundamental question that
motivated Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle: What makes a good society? In
every epoch this question has particular context and character; in the last
two centuries, issues that have shaped that core social question include the
nature of human subjectivity, the politics of state and social power, and the
role of language in mediating cultural conflict – the issue that this article
addresses by focusing on how the classic community-autonomy tension
shaped the public debate about Mormon polygamy. As we have seen,
nineteenth-century polygamy posed a profound threat to prevailing notions
of family, sexuality, and social order generally.
Using the “case” of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy, I have
explored some of the manifold rhetorical strategies that writers or speakers
use to pursue their discursive goals. Broadly speaking, such goals are
invariably related to the desire to persuade others of the legitimacy of a
certain value, opinion, perspective, ideology, or the like. I have considered
140
nineteenth-century cultural narratives concerned with criticizing or
embracing the experience of American women who chose to be part of the
Mormon church and thus to accept the practice of polygamy. I have also
considered nineteenth-century legal141 narratives of Mormon polygamy,
narratives produced by judges to explain why plural marriage undertaken in
the name of religious belief could be prohibited, and why plural marriage
had to yield to the tradition of monogamous marriage so as to maintain
“good social order.“ Both kinds of narratives tended to be more
“fundamentalist“ than “literary,“ although legal (judicial) narratives were
perhaps more deliberately principled in their stated commitment to the
related values of legal precedent and social tradition.
My rhetorical approach to the American “telling“ of Mormon polygamy
over a century ago illuminates a set of contemporary social controversies
that underscore the paradox of community and autonomy – namely,
controversies surrounding homosexuality, including job and housing
discrimination, military service, private sexual conduct, and, most recently,
same-sex marriage. In this last section, I will suggest ways in which the
138
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method of rhetorical analysis that I have established as to Mormon
polygamy might inform our understanding of the same-sex marriage debate.
First, I will briefly describe the same-sex marriage controversy and how
it embodies the community-autonomy paradox in ways similar to those that
animated the clash of public narratives over nineteenth-century Mormon
polygamy. Next, I will analyze several narratives of homosexuality that are
essentially fundamentalist, narratives mainly having to do with the issue of
homosexual marriage. In contrast, I will then read several narratives of
homosexualty that demonstrate literaryqualities and thus approximate the
ideal of producing crafty narratives of marriage, a social institution far more
complex than most current public narratives would suggest.
B. THE COMMUNITY-AUTONOMY PARADOX
IN POLYGAMYAND HOMOSEXUALITY
Anyone remotely interested in American politics during the last
several years will have noticed the enormous amount of attention focused
on the question of whether homosexuals should be allowed to enter into
legally recognized relationships, whether in the form of civil unions, or,
more controversially, marriage. David Blankenhorn of the Institute for
American Values, an organization that opposes homosexual marriage, has
aptly captured the state of public discourse on this question: “The only way
anybody is talking about marriage these days is in the context of same-sex
marriage.”142 Indeed, in the wake of both the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
143
in Lawrence v. Texas and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’
ruling in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,144 the question of
same-sex marriage has fueled innumerable cultural debates, influenced
many political campaigns, emboldened some citizens to engage in civil
disobedience, and led to calls for state and federal legislators to amend their
constitutions. The political air is thick with narratives about marriage,
homosexuals, and whether they belong together.
Whether one individual or group “belongs” within a larger
community (be it physical or ideological) is one of the major fault lines of
the community-autonomy paradox, and perhaps the most salient in the eyes
of the law, which must concern itself with problems and principles of
fairness and justice in matters including exclusion, association, and identity.
In the case of nineteenth-century Mormon polygamy, we have seen that the
Supreme Court decided that a singular religious community could be
142
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excluded from the protection of the Constitution because that community
engaged in conduct that, although religiously motivated, was deemed
harmful to marriage, family, and social order.145
Consider the matrix of community and autonomy dynamics at work
in that situation: Mormons, after years of searching for (and finally finding)
geographic autonomy, sought legal autonomy as a unique religious
community; many female members of that autonomous religious
community fought for the autonomy of individual women everywhere, such
that those Mormon women were part of an ideological community devoted
to the value of personal autonomy; many members of that broad ideological
community of feminists seeking autonomy excoriated the marriage
practices of their Mormon sisters on the ground that such practices were
destructive to the very ideal of individual autonomy that united all of them
in the first place; and those anti-polygamy feminists were also members of a
still larger general community that tended to excoriate Mormons because
they viewed polygamy as destructive to proper Christian religion, to the
conventional family structure, and to the stability of the prevailing social
order.
For each individual embedded in this matrix, the tension between
the ideals of community and autonomy truly was a paradox – an inevitable,
complex, and unsettling state of affairs that required difficult personal,
political, and religious choices. Every such choice about cultural values and
identity perforce rests on threshold interpretive or reading choices – i.e.,
internal choices about what one believes is the right way to live; social
choices about whether and how to represent one’s values to others and how
to interpret what others are saying about their own values; and choices
about how, in light of these other choices, one will speak and behave as a
social actor. As discussed in Part II, many or all of these critical choices
may be “settled” in the sense that they reflect an inherited, unexamined
paradigm of values, in which case all other decisions are effectively premade.
This is common, though not necessary, to religious belief, which
people often invoke as the trumping perspective by which to decide all
other matters. Whether that dispositive perspective be religious, political,
or other, this is what Scholes refers to as a “fundamentalist” way of reading
– as “zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an unearned certainty of
146
meaning“; what Rorty characterizes as “accept[ing] somebody else’s
description of oneself, to execute a previously prepared program, to write,
at most, elegant variations on previously written poems“;147 and what Haber
sees as allowing our “prejudices [to] become dangerous“ because “they are
145
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dogmatic, kept hidden from view and not open to discussion.“148 In short,
the dissonance and anxiety that come with such genuine paradoxes of
autonomy and community tempt us to engage in our reading and narrating
of the world simplistically, relying on inherited understandings to complex
problems and expressing public narratives that reinforce this more
intellectually comfortable state of affairs. When this is the avenue we take,
we evade the challenge of creating our own authentic narratives that address
the evolving realities of our society – realities such as the emergence of an
openly gay community of people whose publicy narrated ways of being,
much like those of the nineteenth-century Mormons, challenge many
traditional narratives of family, sexuality, and social order.
This challenge has taken various forms over the last half century,
and especially since the Stonewall riots of 1969, as the status of
homosexuals in American society has evolved from near invisibility to
active, open presence.149 As to homosexuality, the most current example of
this challenge of how to personally reconcile the community-autonomy
paradox is the problem of same-sex marriage.
Contemporary
homosexuals150 face a paradox similar to that experienced by nineteenthcentury Mormon feminists.
Consider, for example, the matrix of possible community-autonomy
dynamics at work in this situation: after years of social and legal struggle to
achieve even a partial degree of cultural acceptance and legitimacy, many
homosexuals find themselves torn between profound loyalty to a hard-won
148

Haber, supra note 47, at 1.
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distinction is heuristically necessary for my purposes here, I recognize that so clean and
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gay cultural identity and a long-desired freedom to gain full social
recognition, through marriage, for their committed life relationships; most
openly gay people have developed, through their culturally communal
solidarity with other homosexuals, a crucial sense of personal autonomy for
purposes of living in an often homophobic American society; yet for many,
loyalty to this foundational, sustaining community of other homosexuals is
now in some degree of conflict with the prospect of gaining the right to
legally marry their partners, because marriage itself has been, and continues
to be, symbolic of the exclusion of homosexuals from the larger community
of prevailing beliefs and practices regarding religion, family, and sexuality;
thus to fight for and exercise the right to marry creates division within what
has largely been, but is less and less, a culturally unified, even insular, gay
community, because the choice to marry is, quintessentially, both a
personal, autonomous act and a gesture of assimilation into the larger
American community – and thus a dilution, if not a betrayal, of the precious
151
solidarity of the foundational gay community.
Again, as with early Mormon women, individual homosexuals
embedded in this matrix of personal and communal values and loyalties
face a genuine paradox – a conflicted state of affairs that requires hard
personal choices about ultimately irreconcilable matters of identity and selfrepresentation. Also, then, for both advocates and opponents of same-sex
marriage, the perils of fundamentalist reading, interpreting, and narrating
are significant, for the temptation is great to embrace settled and certain –
rather than ambiguous and challenging – narratives, especially on so central
151

One gay critic suggests that the greatest danger in this process of “narrative
assimilation“ is that gays will lose touch with their sense of autonomy as a distinct,
subversive community:
When the gay liberation movement was formed in 1969, we had a broad,
expansive vision of social justice. We wanted to change the world and
make it better – not just for gay men and lesbians . . . but for everyone.
We wanted to find alternatives to the traditional structures under which
we were raised, structures that many of us found insufficient to meet our
needs and desires. We aligned ourselves with other movements and
learned from them. We got “Gay is Good“ from the Black Power
movement’s “Black is Beautiful.“ From the new feminist movement, we
learned that patriarchy – especially when it mandated compulsory
heterosexuality – was as bad for queers as it was for women. We also
believed, like many feminists, that marriage was, at its best, an imperfect
institution, and, at its worst, a dangerous one. . . . All this, obviously, has
changed. The gay movement today has gone out of the radical-socialchange business and taken up a franchise in the let’s-just-fight-forequality business.
Michael Bronski, Why Do Gays Want to Say “I Do?”, Z MAGAZINE, vol. 16, no.
10 (2003).
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a cultural matter.
C. SHOWCASING THE MORAL SYLLOGISM:
FUNDAMENTALIST PUBLIC NARRATIVES OF HOMOSEXUALITY
In an editorial published in the Washington Times in April 2004,
entertainer Pat Boone sounded a moral alarm that, for its sheer
ominousness, is resonant of Congressman McClernand’s 1860 warning
about the evils of polygamy:
We’re at war. And I’m not talking about the war against
terrorism, with its dreadful daily reminders. I’m talking
about the civil – and increasingly uncivil – culture war now
raging across America . . . . If we win, we may be able to
rebuild the institution of marriage as the sacred bedrock of
American societies. If they win, we will have moral anarchy
. . . . There are moral absolutes in this life – and the sacred
152
institution of marriage is one of them.
Boone’s remarks are typical of the public narratives expressed in recent
years by those who oppose gay marriage on religious (usually Christian)
grounds: highly fundamentalist, in that such narratives deploy the language
and imagery of holy war – framing the conflict in binary, us-versus-them
terms and invoking an absolute moral authority to justify a conclusion of
which their authors are certain.
Two aspects of Boone’s cultural jeremiad are especially striking as
to the community-autononomy paradox and the fundamentalist-literary
spectrum of narrative. The first is that by painting this public controversy
as a cleanly delineated “war“ that, if lost, will result in “moral anarchy,“
Boone implies that America is composed of two warring communities, with
little or nothing in between; the idea of an ambivalent, complex, or nuanced
perspective on gay marriage seems unacceptable in this narrative. The
second is that Boone taps into precisely the same narrative upon which the
Supreme Court (and most of America) relied in the late nineteenth century
to prohibit the Mormons from practicing polygamy: the moral syllogism
that (1) traditional marriage is “the sacred bedrock of American societies“;
(2) that permitting a different version of that sacred marriage concept will
surely ruin marriage as we know it (this is the unarticulated, enthymemic
minor premise); and thus (3) the ruin of the traditional marriage concept
will ruin society – “[i]f they win, we will have moral anarchy.“
Consistent with the rules of formal logic, if the reader accepts the
major and minor premises, then the conclusion inexorably follows. Here,
152
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while it is difficult to dispute the empirical validity of the major premise
(i.e., conventional heterosexual, monogamous marriage has been, for better
or worse, the structural center of modern western civilizations), the minor
premise – the unspoken assumption that allowing any variation on the
established order of marriage will necessarily denigrate that convention –
seems, at least on its own, far from clear, regardless of one’s views on the
sexual orientation of individuals.153
As in Boone’s editorial, some version of the logical syllogism is
typically operative in all public narratives; this is especially the case in legal
reasoning, where the value of “logic“ is paramount. Jerome Bruner
evocatively makes this point about the normative nature of all rhetorical
acts of “framing,“ whether in conventional stories or legal arguments:
Stories surely are not innocent: they always have a message,
most often so well concealed that even the teller knows not
what ax he may be grinding. For example, stories typically
begin by taking for granted (and asking the hearer or reader
to take for granted) the ordinariness or normality of a given
state of things in the world – what ought to prevail when Red
Riding Hood visits her grandmother, or what a black kid
ought to expect on arriving at a school door in Little Rock,
Arkansas, after Brown v. Board of Education struck down
154
racial segregation.
As Bruner suggests, to “tak[e] for granted (and asking the hearer or reader
to take for granted) the ordinariness or normality of a given state of things
in the world”155 is, in principle, to posit the major premise of an argument,
153

As a preface to his core coventional-marriage-as-sacred-social-foundation narrative,
Boone appeals to the contemporary American reader’s understandable concern about
current dangers: “We are at war.“ This otherwise common rhetorical strategy (appeal to
something familiar to the reader in order to make a point about an analogically related
matter) is notable for where it leads: as between the physical “war against terrorism“ and
the ideological war over the meaning of marriage, Boone’s ensuing narrative seems to
suggest that the war about marriage is the more consequential of the two. If the reader is
persuaded by Boone’s strategy and thus believes that the war for ownership of the meaning
of marriage is paramount, then it is fair to say that devotion to the traditional concept of
marriage has itself reached the status of religion, in addition to being an important
component of religion. See Niebuhr, supra text accompanying note 21, at 6-9; see also
BLOOM, supra note 21, at 30. (Recall Niebuhr’s wording that “[t]he mark of religion is that
it is the practice of an ultimate concern that orders all other concerns, an unconditioned
loyalty that trumps all other loyalties.“) Boone’s assertion that “[t]here are moral absolutes
in this life – and the sacred institution of marriage is one of them“ seems to comport with
this reading of his marriage narrative as tantamount to scripture.
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whether explicitly (as in conventional arguments) or implicitly (as in
conventional narratives – “stories“). Thus even where the speaker is a
social commentator, like Boone, the framing of the terms of the argument –
the “taking for granted . . . the ordinariness or normality of a given state of
things“ – is an inevitably normative act.
It is crucial to understand the rhetorical function and power of the
moral syllogism, for these help demonstrate the basic relationship between
the fundamentalist-literary narrative spectrum and the communityautonomy paradox. First, because the act of framing a moral syllogism – of
positing the premises of one’s argument – inheres in all argumentnarratives, it matters tremendously whether the speaker’s framing act if
more or less fundamentalist or literary, for the character of the narrative
follows directly from that threshold rhetorical decision. Boone’s narrative
on marriage, for example, takes for granted both that marriage is “the sacred
bedrock“ of our society and that permitting a same-sex variation on that
sacred idea will ruin our way of life. As I have pointed out, while the first
of these premises is at least empirically sound, the second is far from clear
or persuasive except to those who already believe it; this second premise
does not even pretend to address alternative perspectives or beliefs, such
that the terms of the discussion are firmly set, rather than open to
discussion, and the conclusion that permitting same-sex marriage will create
“moral anarchy“ is inevitable. This makes for a narrative that leans heavily
toward the fundamentalist end of the reading spectrum, since it both
precludes open discussion and conceals any possible conflict or
156
ambiguity.
Second, once an author has framed a narrative so as to “draft“ on the
momentum of the moral syllogism embedded in that narrative, the author
has essentially drawn lines of ideological community, rhetorically including
those who agree with the author’s premises, excluding those who disagree,
and possibly persuading those who are undecided. This three-part audience
map will form and potentially evolve depending on how literary or
fundamentalist the author makes the narrative. Thus, for example, a
narrative framed according to a heavily fundamentalist moral syllogism,
like Boone’s, will yield an audience map starkly divided into just two areas
– the land of the converted and the land of the enemy – with no land for
those in the middle. This fundamentalist narrative approach makes for
clearly identifiable, strictly autonomous ideological communities, but tends
to preclude open, meaningful exchange between the communities as well as
the possiblity that someone with mixed views might arrive at a thoughtful,
156
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educated conclusion.
The author of a more literary narrative, on the other hand, will tend
to build upon a moral syllogism whose premises are transparent, openly
articulated, and susceptible of reasonable inquiry and disagreement. This
does not mean that the literary narrative must eschew commitment to
particular values. On the contrary, the literary narrative must be especially
principled, in that the moral syllogism upon which the narrative proceeds
must be open to ambiguity, complexity, and difference – and the substantive
ideology of that moral syllogism, the speaker’s values as to that narrative,
must survive or fail in the face of those tempering factors. Accordingly, the
literary narrative will produce broader, more nuanced, more porously
boundaried audience communities, because the underlying moral syllogism
will not dictate a strictly divided map of the ideological landscape, but will
instead allow for both overlap among communities and for one’s
membership in multiple communities.157 In short, and at the risk of
indulging in too many religious metaphors, the fundamentalist narrative will
tend to “preach to the converted,“ while the literary narrative will tend to
engage with the multitudes.
Among legal narratives of homosexuality, Justice Byron White’s
1986 majority opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick is exemplary of the
fundamentalist narrative. Justice White‘s opinion rests on a moral
158
syllogism about homosexuality quite similar to the moral syllogism that
Chief Justice Waite relied on in Reynolds.159 In Bowers, White initially
framed the opinion by adroitly sifting alternative threshold questions from
157

My characterization of ideological communities has much in common with the
notion of “interpretive communities” that has emerged in literary theory in recent decades.
See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1978); DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 36.
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Judicial opinions typically proceed on the basis of at least one central syllogism, a
rhetorical device well suited to the necessary judicial framing of the issues in a case. While
few judicial opinions specifically identify all three formal parts of the syllogism (i.e., the
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invariably at work, given the need in the common law judicial process to frame issues and
reach conclusions on the authority of established precedent. That is, the major premise of
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where the judge’s critical framing decision comes into play. Once a judge frames that
major premise, the scope of possible minor premises narrows, and, more important, the
conclusion that follows from both premises is nearly inevitable. This syllogistic
mechanism is a salient example of how “logic“ matters in a rhetorical way in legal
reasoning: the framing of the major and minor premises are authorial choices, shaped by a
judge’s discretion and values, be they principled or not; but the conclusion that follows is
more predictable, as it is dictated by the initial premises. For a federal appellate judge’s
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(1997).
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the question upon which he would base his reasoning:
This case does not require a judgment on whether
laws against sodomy between consenting adults in general,
or between homosexuals in particular, are wise or desirable.
It raises no question about the right or propriety of state
legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize
homosexual sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating
those laws on state constitutional grounds. The issue
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still
make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time.160
White re-emphasized this threshold question in observing that “[p]recedent
aside, . . . respondent [Hardwick] would have us announce . . . a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”161
The major premise of White’s moral syllogism can be stated as a
straightforward question: Does the Constitution provide homosexuals the
fundamental right to have sodomy? From here, Justice White follows the
logical momentum of this major premise.
In William Eskridge‘s
description:
As narrowed in this way, Hardwick’s claim struck the
Supreme Court as unlike those in earlier privacy cases,
which had arisen in the context of heterosexual intimacy.
Key to the Court’s analysis was its belief that the due process
right of privacy could only be applied to protect those
fundamental liberties “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition.‘“ Because “homosexual sodomy“ had long
been criminal in Anglo-American law, the Court held that
there was no “‘deeply rooted‘“ liberty Hardwick could claim.
In the light of history, the Court majority found Hardwick’s
162
fundamental rights claim “at best, facetious.“
Eskridge identifies the minor premise of White’s syllogism, which can be
stated in relation to the major premise like this: In order to receive the status
of “fundamental“ Constitutional right claimed here, the right must protect
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behavior that is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.“163
It takes little imagination to surmise what the Court’s conclusion
would be to the question raised, in effect, by the combined premises of
Justice White’s moral syllogism: Is consensual homosexual activity “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition“?164 It seems certain that in no
nation’s “history and tradition“ is homosexual activity “deeply rooted.“
Accordingly, could the opinion logically proceed in any direction other than
it did, summarily concluding that private sex between consenting
homosexual adults is not protected by the Constitution?
It is worth noting that Justice White articulated another possible
minor premise to go along with the requirement that the right be “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Relying on language from
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), White reasoned that
homosexual sodomy must be one of “those fundamental liberties that are
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.”165 Although White summarily
dispensed with this premise as well (“[i]t is obvious to us that neither of
these formulations would extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to
engage in acts of consensual sodomy”166), this “formulation” had the
potential to produce a more literary analysis than its alternative.
Unlike the “deeply rooted in . . . tradition” minor premise that White
relied on, which, in fundamentalist fashion, effectively precluded discussion
by deferring the question to the Judeo-Christian moral tradition, this
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” formulation might have enabled
White to leaven his judicial narrative with greater nuance and thus engage a
broader audience. Indeed, the term “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,” combined with the admonition to consider whether “liberty” or
“justice would exist if [the claimed right] were sacrificed,” would seem to
open the discussion of homosexuality up to a broad, culture-sensitive
analysis. For example, the term “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
is far more open to different and changing behavioral norms than is the term
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” which narrows the
scope of analysis to an easily categorized, fundamentalist recitation of the
indisputable fact that Judeo-Christian history has not been kind to
homosexuals. Similarly, to ask whether “liberty” or “justice would exist” if
the right of homosexuals to have private, consensual, sex “were sacrificed”
is a genuinely complex, open-ended question, at least in contemporary
society. Thus both parts of this alternative premise would yield a more
163
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literary analysis of the behavior at issue in Bowers than the opinion itself
demonstrates.
In addition, the choice of determinative formulations that White
applies here is crucial, for it defines ideological communities as to the
outcome of the case – communities comprised of those readers who respond
similarly to the decision according to shared values about, say, sexual
identity or the right to privacy. As it was decided, Bowers tended to
produce sharply divided reactions and thus distinct, adversarial ideological
communities regarding the issues at stake. Such divisions, while not
physical or geographic boundaries, nonetheless define two virtual
communities with opposing values. As to public engagement and social
change, the boundaries distinguishing such ideological communities would
seem more consequential.
It may well be that the distinct communities defined by the
controversial issue of homosexuality would be hard to integrate in any
event, but honest, fair, meaningful dialogue is at least more possible if the
opinion draws more flexible, negotiable ideological lines – a result that
would have been more likely had White’s argument-narrative focused on
the two alternative premises discussed above. For example, although the
majority of Americans would not choose to engage in homosexual activity,
neither does it seem likely that a majority would see “justice” in summarily
“sacrificing” protection for the private sexual acts of others, even
homosexuals – at least not without thoughtfully exploring the ramifications
of the question. Indeed, such a malleable distinction would produce
somewhat overlapping communities, reflecting at least a measure of shared
ideology and thus the possibility of dialogue, understanding, and progress
as to complex social controversies.
In the end, White’s judicial narrative, while not unsophisticated in
its rhetorical style, is remarkably fundamentalist in its substance, for it
resolves the controversy before the Court by essentially asking a question
from which only one answer could logically follow. White could have
formulated other, more literary “framing“ questions (i.e., major premises)167
or, as discussed above, contemplated more culture- and context-sensitive
minor premises and still have arrived at the same conclusion – but with the
result that Bowerswould undoubtedly have earned greater legitimacy, if not
agreement, within both the legal community and the general population.
This has become increasingly clear over time given the enduring criticism
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of the opinion168 – culminating in the Court’s pointed overruling of Bowers
169
in 2003.
Fundamentalist narratives of homosexuality are not exclusive to
those who oppose gay rights, of course, and we can look to the same-sex
marriage debate for evidence that narrators on the other side of the issue are
capable of the fundamentalist tendency to simplify the complexities of both
social controversy and the community-autonomy paradox. Although most
gays and lesbians appear to be unified behind the push to legalize same-sex
marriage as a matter of equality, homosexuals nonetheless face a version of
the community-autonomy paradox in this context as well: they fear that the
assimilation required to embrace marriage – that most mainstream of
cultural “sacraments“ – will mean the erosion, if not the surrender, of their
rich, distinct sense of communal autonomy, in exchange for a generic,
suffocating cultural status. This fear, however justified, has led to
narratives of same-sex marriage that embody some of the same categorical
tendencies that characterize the fundamentalist narratives that I have
discussed above.
For example, the lesbian feminist writer Cheryl Clarke has remarked
that “permanency for gays, lesbians, and other same-sex variants is the very
170
prong we ‘gets hung on‘ when the arguments for marriage equality come
up. We want that forever thing or the thing forever.“171 Asserting that
“Marriage trivializes our partnerships,“ Clarke inveighs against the
mainstreaming of “our movement“ by “liberals“:
I am calling upon bulldaggers, dykes, faggots, feminist
femmes, fierce sissies, and other outrageous progressive
queers to have a major multicultural sexual liberation
confabulation to take our movement back from liberals.
Because marriage equality with its rhetoric of sameness is
not why we came out of the closet in 1969 or before. We
came out to dismantle marriage as an institution.172
Although marriage is indeed one of the most dominant, idealized,
heavily mediated (and mediating) of American cultural narratives,173
168
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phrasing of “getting hungs on” from ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE
WATCHING GOD, (1937).
171
Id.
172
Id (emphasis added).
173
As Michael Bronski puts it,
169

58

RHETORICAL HOLY WAR

Pingree

marriage, like any other human relationship, is nonetheless
inherently ambiguous, challenging, and unpredictable – a
relationship at least as complex as the parties involved. Thus
marriage would genuinely “trivialize“ a gay relationship only to the
extent that the people involved took a fundamentalist, rather than a
literary, view of the whole adventure.
No relationship can avoid some kind of categorization, even
a relationship that which defines itself by defying all categories. But
it is not the mere fact of belonging to a category, however top-heavy
it may be with social expectation, that makes one’s experience and
narration of that relationship a fundamentalist one. Rather, what
invites the bondage of fundamentalist categorization is one’s
unwillingness to develop literary habits of mind and action, one’s
failure to remain vigilant toward the dangers of living and narrating
one’s relationships in settled, inherited, unthinking ways. While
those who have experienced hurtful social or cultural
marginalization (here, as to sexual identity) are attuned to the harms
of cultural myopia and self-righteousness in ways that beneficiaries
of the status quo usually are not, the choice to construct literary over
fundamentalist narratives is just that – a choice, not a given. So to
dismiss (as Clarke seems to) all marriage relationships as
irreversibly mediated by a “rhetoric of sameness“ and beholden to
the insurmountable ideal of “heteronormativity“ is to mimic that
very rhetoric of sameness. This serves only to perpetuate the kind of
174
narrative fundamentalism unabashedly proclaimed by Pat Boone,
albeit probably not as close to that end of the narrative spectrum.
D: TOWARD A “CRAFTY“ NARRATIVE OF MARRIAGE

[m]arriage is so much the expectation and norm that even heterosexual
couples have to explain why they don’t want to get married. It is what
we are all brought up to want and never given much permission to
question. It is a cultural myth many of us still embrace, despite all the
evidence suggesting that “happily ever after“ is more aptly applied to
fairy tales than marriages. For some couples – straight and gay – getting
married is easier than not getting married. It is a learned cultural
response that is easier to give in to than to fight.
Bronski, supra note 151. Bronski’s point may find support in that a growing number of
books on how gays can plan for their weddings seem, at least by their titles, to imitate the
nuptial narratives advertised by America’s massive marriage industry. See, e.g., DAVID
TOUSSAINT WITH HEATHER LEO, GAY AND LESBIAN WEDDINGS: PLANNING THE PERFECT
SAME-SEX CEREMONY (2004); K.C. DAVID, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAY AND LESBIAN
WEDDINGS (2005).
174
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In bringing this article to a close, I want to return to Scholes‘ notion
of the “crafty reader,“175 an approach to public narrative that enables
meaningfully principled yet open-ended debate about controversial issues –
those most in need of nuanced understanding – and, in the process, sheds
light on the community-autonomy fault lines that run through virtually all
important social conflicts. I will consider a few examples of what might
constitute a “crafty“ reading of same-sex marriage, a stern test for any
interpretive paradigm because of the import of the stakes and the seeming
irreconcilability of the fundamentalist positions on either side of the issue.
To purposefully revise an established cultural narrative, particularly one as
deeply anchored as the traditional narrative of marriage, is a herculean task.
Yet there is no acceptable alternative if we value the ideal of a pluralistic
society. So I submit that, short of the ideal of full compatibility, crafty
reading nonetheless offers all sides the possibility of enriched, elevated
public discourse on this profoundly divisive issue.
Recall that Scholes characterizes the crafty reader as one who
“acknowledge[s] the seriousness of fundamentalist readings, while resisting
and criticizing the zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an unearned
certainty of meaning, achieved by turning a deaf ear to the complexity of
the texts themselves, their histories, and their present situations.“176 In
analyzing the rhetorical holy wars over nineteenth-century Mormon
polygamy and present-day homosexuality, I have attempted to explore the
merits of this narrative prescription by closely reading what are largely
fundamentalist narratives and thereby demonstrating the costs and
limitations of the rhetorical strategies that drive them.
In crafty narratives, by contrast, we see ways in which literary (or
more literary) readers deploy rhetorical strategies to produce narratives that
more accurately represent the realities of people who experience, by virtue
of the politicized status of their cultural identities, dramatic versions of the
paradox of community and autonomy. First, for example, consider how two
judicial narrators frame the issues before them in two landmark legal
decisions. The first is from Justice Kennedy’s 1996 majority opinion in
Romer v. Evans,177 the other from Chief Justice Marshall’s 2003 majority
opinion in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.178
Justice Kennedy’s opening to the Romer opinion is, for being simply
constructed and straightforwardly expressed, literary in the sense that it
engages us by speaking to important cultural identity values that most of us
actually share:

175

Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Id. at 219.
177
Romer, 517 U.S. 620, supra note 14.
178
Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d 941, supra note 144.
176

60

RHETORICAL HOLY WAR

Pingree

One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this
Court that the Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). Unheeded then, those
words now are understood to state a commitment to the
law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. The
Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle and today
requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado’s
Constitution.179
This decision addressed the question of the constitutionality of Colorado’s
voter-ratified Amendment 2, which would have precluded future antidiscrimination legislation protecting homosexuals in any state context.180
However, the underlying issue here – homosexual rights, or, even more
basically, the freedom to pursue one’s identity as an American, regardless
of one’s sexual orientation – is neither mentioned nor even clearly implied.
Yet Kennedy subtly creates a powerful opening to a narrative argument in
which, to be effective, he must open his readers’ minds to the possibility of
a concept of political identity that includes homosexuals.
Kennedy’s first rhetorical choice is to invoke the notorious Supreme
181
Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, the late nineteenth-century case in
which the Court let stand Jim Crow laws that effectively preserved much of
the inequality, if not the outright slavery, of ante-bellum America, even
some thirty years after the end of the Civil War. The Plessy decision is
commonly invoked in contemporary American culture – in high school and
college history classes and textbooks, in law school lectures, in political
debates, and so on – to represent wrong and outdated racist attitudes of the
past. Thus in associating himself with Justice Harlan, who famously
dissented from that now stigmatized decision, Justice Kennedy sets a tone
and direction for the Romer opinion that suggest long-overdue rectification
of a broad social wrong, here the formal exclusion of gays and lesbians
from the protection of civil rights laws, and even from the legislative
process necessary to enact those laws.
Kennedy’s next move reinforces, then builds upon, this show of judicial
reparation: having supplied with Plessy a symbol of past racism and
injustice, Kenney comes to the present, reminding the reader that Harlan’s
“[u]nheeded” words “now are understood to state a commitment to the
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law’s neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake.”182 Kennedy has
not randomly drawn from the past to argue in the present; he has chosen
Harlan’s memorable cry in the American political wilderness as the starting
point of his opinion because it provides an emotionally appealing and
logically solid foundation on which to construct his explanation, indeed his
justification, for the Court’s decision to do in 1996 for gays and lesbians
what the Court would not do in 1896 for black Americans. Kennedy’s key
rhetorical strategy is to link Harlan’s now unobjectionable clarion call for
racial justice to the esteemed narrative that the law must, of necessity, be
neutral, especially when it affects people’s rights. At first glance this may
seem redundant, but it is by such incremental steps that today’s legal
arguments become tomorrow’s legal rules and standards, as well as the
basis for evolving social and cultural norms. Thus Kennedy has little to
lose and much to gain, rhetorically, in stating what may seem obvious – that
the law should be neutral toward all persons. This notion is, of course,
basic to the American legal tradition and crucial to the continued political
and social legitimacy of the nation’s courts, most of all the Supreme Court.
Kennedy completes this moral syllogism, which will serve to flavor the
tone and frame the reasoning of the entire Romer narrative-argument, by
making the project of judicial rectification, and the ethic of legal neutrality
that drives it, subject to one of the federal Constitution’s most potent
doctrines: “The Equal Protection Clause enforces this principle [of
neutrality] and today requires us to hold invalid a provision of Colorado’s
183
Constitution.” Again, while this conclusion may seem (at least to a lay
reader) overly deferential to the authority of the U.S. Constitution, not to
mention self-evident, it is precisely such a direct appeal to established
textual authority that enables lawyers and judges to fashion the practically
manageable questions and socially determinate solutions that are the
essence of legal argumentation and discourse – legal narrative in the
broadest sense. Indeed, the narrative progress of conventional legal
discourse depends upon an almost maddeningly compact and painstaking
kind of argumentation, in which the author (whether judge or advocate)
seeks to validate her assertions by tightly weaving precedent and analogy as
she carefully moves up and down the scale of abstract rules and concrete
possibilities.
Kennedy’s use of analogy is a crafty, and thus more likely to be
persuasive, deployment of narrative. This is because analogy, essentially a
narrative metaphor, operates by invoking something known or familiar – an
experience, event, situation, concept, argument, or (more likely) some
combination of these and other tropes – in order to make accessible
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something unknown or unfamiliar.184 Thus when Kennedy invokes Plessy,
he brings to mind a well established, layered narrative of slavery,
discrimination, lack of equality, ignorance, bias, collective guilt, Jim Crow,
segregated lunch counters, and so on. Whatever else he is attempting in his
opening, Kennedy uses that familiar narrative to morally engage the reader.
This is quite distinct from Justice White’s use of analogy in Bowers.
There, White distinguished private, consensual, gay sex from several other
private behaviors – among them procreation, interracial marriage,
contraception, and abortion – to which the Court had previously granted
constitutional protection.185 But White’s analogical reasoning, like his
framing and application of the premises of his moral syllogism – asking and
answering narrowly tailored yet broadly manipulable questions186 – has the
dismissive, conclusory feel of analysis-by-fiat:
[W]e think it is evident that none of the rights announced in
those cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of
sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated. . .
.187
White makes no attempt to reason about how or why sexual activity188
between two men is different from the intimate matters of marriage and
procreation between a man and a woman – let alone to explain how the one
bears no “resemblance” to the other. Leaving aside the ultimate disposition
of the case, White seems not to have wanted to engage the merits – namely,
the complex issue of how we define, or should define, what is private or
intimate between individuals for purposes of legal protection. To impose
such a narrow, closed reading on such a broad, open issue is a
fundamentalist narrative choice indeed.
By contrast, Kennedy’s reading of the homosexuality in Romer is
engaged with history and context, open and attentive to the evolution of
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moral sensibility over time.189 This is clear from the effect of the opening
paragraph alone. Having experienced the narrative resonance of Plessy, the
reader is predisposed to see the more novel or unfamiliar situation presented
in Romer in a similar light: “Plessy meant unfair treatment of a certain class
of people for unacceptable reasons; perhaps Romer will mean the same
thing if it is not decided differently.” At core, Kennedy’s narrative here is a
simple and persuasive moral allegory, engaging us, at the level of American
cultural identity, toward what Rorty calls “[t]he process of coming to know
oneself, confronting one’s contingency, tracking one’s causes home,“ –
which we achieve, however provisionally, by “inventing a new language –
that is, of thinking up some new metaphors.“190
The opening of Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion in Goodridge
is similarly crafty:
Marriage is a vital social institution. The exclusive
commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love
and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For
those who choose to marry, and for their children, marriage
provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social
benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal, financial, and
191
social obligations.
189

Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 626-37. Kennedy’s discussion of the legal and social
ramifications of Amendment 2 is significantly more thorough and nuanced in its reasoning
than is White’s discussion in Bowers. Interestingly, part of Kennedy’s justification for
finding Amendment 2 unconstitutional involves the Court’s treatment of Mormon
polygamists in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) at roughly the same time that Plessy
was decided:
In Davis, the Court approved an Idaho territorial statute denying
Mormons, polygamists, and advocates of polygamy the right to vote and
to hold office because, as the Court construed the statute, it “simply
excludes from the privilege of voting, or of holding any office of honor,
trust, or profit, those who have been convicted of certain offences. . . .
Romer at 634. The Beason court’s benign characterization of the categorical scope of the
territorial statute is strikingly similar to White’s implicit, tradition-based justification of the
Georgia anti-sodomy statue in Bowers. See Bowers at 192-93.
That Kennedy’s legal narrative in Romer is exemplary of crafty reading
(“acknowledg[ing] the seriousness of fundamentalist readings, while resisting and
criticizing the zeal that often results in interpretive leaps to an unearned certainty of
meaning“ and remaining attentive to “the complexity of the texts themselves, their
histories, and their present situations,“ SCHOLES, supra note 36, at 219) is supported, albeit
unwittingly, by Justice Scalia in the famous opening line of his dissent: “The Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.” Romer at 636 (emphasis added).
190
See RORTY, supra note 45, at 27-28.
191
Goodridge, supra note 44, at 312.

64

RHETORICAL HOLY WAR

Pingree

Marshall engages us by articulating the primary American marriage
narrative, a narrative whose moral logic extends straight back to Reynolds192
and affirms the ideological community of traditional marriage advocates.
As with Kennedy’s opening in Romer, which effectively creates an
ideological community centered on the value of anti-racism, this rhetorical
framing makes of most readers (particularly opponents of same-sex
marriage) a coherent ideological community centered on the social value of
marriage. And, as in Romer, this leaves only the question of the degree to
which that community will remain intact through the next step of the court’s
narrative-argument.
That step takes a decidedly literary form, characterizing carefully
and respectfully the two ideological communities in conflict over this issue
and punctuating that pair of community narratives with a succinct statement
of judicial purpose:
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one man
and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many
hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical convictions that
same-sex couples are entitled to be married, and that homosexual
persons should be treated no differently than their heterosexual
neighbors. . . . Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
193
mandate our own moral code.
This last sentence offers a kind of moderating (if not re-unifying) judicial
narrative, a reminder that courts must work to transcend, insofar as that is
possible, the concrete disputes before them, and to resolve those disputes
from a position of principle. Here, that principle – that narrative of “liberty
of all“ – echoes Kennedy’s invocation of the “law’s neutrality where the
rights of persons are at stake.“194
Just as Kennedy did in both Romer and Lawrence,195 here Marshall
creates, by rhetorical appeal to a widely revered value, an ideological
community of readers. The court’s next step, into a copious discussion
declaring unconstitutional the “Commonwealth[s‘] . . . use [of] its
formidable regulatory authority to bar same-sex couples from civil
marriage,“196 is where this ideological community – one unified by a belief
192
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in “the liberty of all“ – divides into distinct interpretive communities along
lines of religious and cultural values. Just what values the ideological
community of “the liberty of all“ should include is, of course, where the
bulk of the debate over same-sex marriage resides. Nevertheless,
Marshall’s rhetorical strategies in legally framing that debate are admirably
literary in their open, principled attempt to fairly characterize and evaluate
the values and complexities of each side. This, like Kennedy’s approach in
Romer, stands in contrast to the preemptivve, fundamentalist framing
choices that White deploys in Bowers.
Conclusion
In a pluralistic liberal democracy, the importance of “crafty“
narrative habits cannot be overestimated. Such “literary“ discursive
methods and attitudes enable genuinely meaningful public discourse and the
consequent, ongoing revision of the boundaries of ideological communities.
These conditions, in turn, make more possible for all the pursuit of
legitimate individual and communal autonomy, because such a selfconscious, self-revising narrative ethos leads us to negotiate, if not resolve,
our complex differences openly, such that we know where we stand with
each other when fresh controversy invites our baser impulses.
The alternative, fundamentalism of thought and speech, is inherently
violent, imposing on ourselves and others reductive narratives of self and
community that narrow our ethical vision and distort our mutual
understanding – “mediation“ of the most destructive kind. Michael Bronski
puts this narrative violence in the context of the same-sex marriage debate:
[Y]ou don’t win the right to marry by telling the world that
queer people’s lives are as confusing, messy, tattered, and
complicated as heterosexual lives. You win the right to
marry, it seems, by presenting to the world, and to the courts,
the most acceptable, most homogeneous, most lovable, most
traditional couples (with kids if possible) you can find.
Given that marriage is, for everyone, a form of sexual
regulation, it is also important to present to the world the
most conventional images of gay behavior.197
197

Bronski, supra note 151. Of course, given the universal desire for cultural
legitimacy, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of marriage to homosexuals:
So why would gay people want to get married? Part of the answer is that
in a world wracked by homophobia, getting an official okay on your
relationship feels great. It is validating and it mutes some of the hurt and
pain inflicted on so many queers by their families, neighbors, coworkers, and society at large.”
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Without question, Bronski believes in the rightness of granting
homosexuals equality in the marriage context. Nevertheless, he suggests
that the cost to homosexuals of winning the right to marry is perhaps too
dear. The cultural assimilation required for such “narrative“ equality would
compel gays to become truly fundamentalist self-narrators, borrowing and
living out an oppressive narrative provided by someone else.198 This kind of
derivative cultural legitimacy would come at the expense of whatever hardearned sense of autonomy homosexuals, as individuals and as a community,
have achieved.
The consequences of our fundamentalist habits of mind are all about
us, in our political campaigns, our culture wars, our shrill internet blogging.
The world we inhabit reminds us daily that such habits of mind, when
indulged to the extreme, pose serious danger to intellectual freedom, to
cultural tolerance, and to social peace. This need not be the path we take,
though it is surely the easiest one.
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